	Page 1
1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 09-50026 (REG)
4	Adv. Case No. 12-09802(REG)
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
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8	GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
9	
10	Debtor.
11	x
12	MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY GUC TRUST,
13	Plaintiff,
14	v.
15	APPALOOSA INVESTMENT LIMITED,
16	Defendant.
17	x
18	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
19	One Bowling Green
20	New York, New York
21	
22	July 26, 2012
23	9:46 AM
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25	

Page 3 1 Hearing re: Debtors' 115th Omnibus Objection to Claims 2 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 3 Executive Employees) 4 5 Hearing re: Debtors' 170th Omnibus Objection to Claims 6 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 7 Executive Employees) 8 9 Hearing re: Debtors' 175th Omnibus Objection to Claims 10 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 11 Executive Employees) 12 13 Hearing re: Debtors' 180th Omnibus Objection to Claims 14 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 15 Executive Employees) 16 17 Hearing re: Debtors' 181st Omnibus Objection to Claims 18 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 19 Executive Employees) 20 Hearing re: Debtors' 182nd Omnibus Objection to Claims 21 22 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 23 Executive Employees) 24 25 Hearing re: Debtors' 183rd Omnibus Objection to Claims

	Page 4
1	(Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and
2	Executive Employees)
3	
4	Hearing re: Debtors' 184th Omnibus Objection to Claims
5	(Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and
6	Executive Employees)
7	
8	Hearing re: Debtors' 185th Omnibus Objection to Claims
9	(Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and
10	Executive Employees)
11	
12	Hearing re: 281st Omnibus Objection to Claims (Insufficient
13	Documentation)
14	
15	Hearing re: Motion to Award of Attorneys Fees from Claim
16	No. 51093 Settlement Fund on behalf of Anderson Class
17	Counsel
18	
19	Hearing re: Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust's
20	Objection to Claim No. 11064 Filed by Cardenas Motors Inc.
21	
22	Hearing re: Adv: 12-09802 - Motion of Aurelius Investment,
23	LLC for Summary
24	
25	Transcribed by: Dawn South and Jacquelyn Goldsmith

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Page 9 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Good morning, have seats, please. All 3 right, good morning. We're here on Motors Liquidation, formally known as General Motors, and I see Mr. Griffiths 4 5 and Ms. Greer here. Are you going to take the lead, 6 Mr. Griffiths? 7 MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. 8 THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead then, thank 9 you. 10 MR. GRIFFITHS: David of Griffiths of Weil, 11 Gotshal & Manges for the Motors Liquidation Company GUC 12 Trust. 13 Your Honor, we have on the calendar this morning 14 ten omnibus objections to claims relating to former 15 employees of General Motors. These are claims that were 16 carried over from the June 14th hearing. 17 If Your Honor recalls, at the June 14th hearing we were handling former employees of the debtors who had 18 19 retired between the 1960s and the 1980s, and Your Honor had requested that the estate attempt to locate summary plan 20 21 descriptions from that period specifying that they had the 22 ability to amend or modify and terminate benefits. 23 Your Honor, we have done so. We placed on the 24 record, and I believe Your Honor has a folder in front of 25 you, the summary plan descriptions starting in 1963.

THE COURT: Yes, I do, Mr. Griffiths. I think you 1 2 have answered the question that I had asked you to follow up 3 on, subject to the employees rights to be heard. In the past when we've had matters of this 4 5 character we've given the folks an opportunity to you speak 6 and then given you a chance to respond and we've had a back 7 and forth until we got it all out. Do you think that makes 8 sense again? 9 MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor, we're happy reply 10 on our existing submissions. 11 THE COURT: Okay. You could help me however by 12 naming the people who you understand to be presenting the 13 issues that I need to deal with today, and then I'm going to 14 invite each one of them to speak. 15 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor. You should 16 have in front of you a folder we prepared with each of the 17 replies in alphabetical order, and I just propose to go in that order. 18 19 THE COURT: That's fine. With you now, 20 Mr. Griffiths, go ahead. 21 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor. And we 22 made available copies of the summary plan descriptions to 23 each of the claimants on the phone today by --24 THE COURT: You've already made them available to

them so they know what you're talking about.

Page 11 MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor, we sent them out 1 2 by FedEx on CDs. 3 So Your Honor, the first claimant would be Ms. 4 Jane C. Bogue, B-O-G-U-E. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Bogue, are you on the 6 phone? 7 MS. BOGUE: Yes, I am, Your Honor. THE COURT: Would you like to be heard? 8 MS. BOGUE: Well, just what I would like to say is 9 10 that I did get the disk that he send out, and I also went 11 back and looked through all the records that I had kept over 12 the years, and starting in 1977 General Motors furnished us 13 with a little booklet that said personal benefit summary and 14 it was a lengthy summary of all your GM benefits, and on the 15 back of each one of those there was a little note and it 16 just said something about General Motors and whatnot. And 17 not until 1987 did the one come out with the note on the 18 back that says General Motors does not have access to your 19 -- any way it says that General Motors has the right to change and amend these benefits, and that's the first one of 20 21 those summary booklets that that came out on was in 1987. 22 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. Mr. Griffiths, can you 23 help us on that, do you want to respond? 24 MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, we've reviewed -- I 25 mean we requested from GM copies of summary plan

descriptions relating to welfare benefit programs and life insurance going as far back as they had them. Every single copy of the welfare benefits summary plan descriptions we received contained the reservation of rights language, and the examples that we provided range from 1963 to 1982, following which we believe the Sprag (ph) -- the ruling in Sprag applies -- and -- or Sprague, and Sprague has referred specifically to summary plan descriptions from 1984 onwards. So the GUC Trust believes that it's covered the entire period that relates to the employment of these -- of those employees. And while I'm happy to look at any documents that Ms. Boque has, the documents and summary plan descriptions we've submitted, pursuant to the declaration of Joseph Smolinsky, should be authoritative on the matter. THE COURT: Did the package that you sent to Ms. Bogue include the plan descriptions for the period during which she was employed? MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor. The -- I mean I'd have to ask Ms. Bogue specifically when she started and finished her employment, but assuming it was between 1963 and the present then she would be covered by what we've already submitted. THE COURT: Ms. Boque, what were the dates of your employment?

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1	MS. BOGUE: 1954 to 1989.
2	THE COURT: 1964 to
3	MS. BOGUE: No, 50, 50.
4	THE COURT: 5-4?
5	MS. BOGUE: Yes, sir.
6	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Griffiths, it appears to me
7	that Ms. Bogue is a real long-time employee and that she may
8	have had nine years of service even before the 1963 date
9	that you referred to.
10	I am wondering whether in her case it would be
11	best to continue this matter one more time to try to either
12	get our arms around the facts or give you a chance to work
13	out a deal with Ms. Bogue.
14	MR. GRIFFITHS: That will be entirely appropriate,
15	Your Honor. We have received summary plan descriptions
16	going back to 1943, which
17	THE COURT: 43?
18	MR. GRIFFITHS: Correct, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: You mean like during the Second World
20	War, 1943?
21	MR. GRIFFITHS: Correct, Your Honor. The GM's
22	records are surprisingly good. I haven't I didn't
23	actually request the copy from 1943 because it had to be
24	it had to come from GM's archives, but these are the ones
25	they could locate as quickly as they could.

THE COURT: Frankly, I would not have thought that I would have needed you to get a search back as far as 1954, but I think we need to do that to be as -- to be fair to Ms. Bogue.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Absolutely, Your Honor. And just to note that each of the summary plan descriptions by their own terms supersede each other, so every time a resulting summary plan description was issued it would then replace the previous one.

THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that, but the legal issue we've been trying to get our arms around is what happens when an employee works part of his career or hers when there is no such reservation of rights, and works the rest when there is. An issue as to which as far as I'm aware there's no reported case yet.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Other than Your Honor's ruling in Chemtura, which I have read and I am aware of.

THE COURT: Well, my memory in Chemtura is that I didn't expressly deal with that and I invited people to do the same thing you're doing, which is to get more facts for me or better yet settle it, and I -- and my memory is that there was a lawyer in Connecticut, whose name I've now forgotten, who had represented a bunch of employees who had service both before and after Chemtura reserved the right, and that the matter ultimately settled.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor, and I believe in Chemtura there was a situation where one claimant had certain benefits which were subject to reservation of rights pursuant to the plan and other benefits that were not, and these benefits that can be distinguished insofar as all of the benefits were provided under one plan which, you know, reserved the right to amend or modify in full. But Your Honor, we'll absolutely continue the matter with respect to Ms. Boque given her employment. THE COURT: Okay. It's obvious that your prep for this hearing is better than my memory of Chemtura. But with that said I think we agree on the game plan. Ms. Boque, are you with me in terms of what we're doing? MS. BOGUE: I can -- I don't hear real well, but I think I understand. May I just say one thing about the disk that Mr. Griffiths sent me? THE COURT: Sure. MS. BOGUE: I don't -- my computer won't even play it, I had to get a neighbor to let me even look at that, and what that was, was copies of hand out booklets that GM put

I don't even know that we at our local GMAC office

here in Longview received those booklets. That was not

anything that went to an individual, it was just handouts

that routinely General Motors got little handout booklets,

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Page 16 1 and I believe that's what those were that you sent copies of 2 on that disk. Is that not right? 3 THE COURT: Well, you got to put your comments to 4 me, Ms. Bogue. 5 MS. BOGUE: I'm sorry, okay. 6 THE COURT: But I'm perfectly happy to give 7 Mr. Griffiths a chance to answer that question. By the way 8 you said Longview, is that Longview, Texas? 9 MS. BOGUE: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 MS. BOGUE: And it was GMAC and we were a small 12 office and we did routinely get little ole booklets that 13 they'd put out on a little book stand, you know, but they 14 were not given to individuals and not gone over with us in 15 any way. I don't even know that we ever saw half of the 16 booklets that were on that disk. I don't really know. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Well, it's also possible that 18 what Mr. Griffiths gave you covered more than just you. 19 In any event --20 MS. BOGUE: Oh, yes, sir. Oh, yes, sir, these 21 were just little routine booklets that I guess went out to 22 every General Motors office or whatever. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MS. BOGUE: It was nothing to me. 25 THE COURT: Well, here's what I would like to do.

MS. BOGUE: Okay.

THE COURT: Mr. Griffiths, the way that we can deal with these issues in commercial cases doesn't always translate perfectly when we have people, you know, who are regular folks who don't have access to computers and all of the technology and stuff like that.

So what I'd like you to do as a courtesy to me and to Ms. Bogue is to send her paper copies of anything where GM has reason to believe that she either got it or should have gotten it or should have had access to it, and then we'll sort it out later. And I would like you for these folks, or at least anybody who asks for it, to give them to them in paper form rather than in electronic form.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor, absolutely. And to be clear, we had just as a -- to lower the cost of the estate and the environment we had sent out the copies on CDs and noted in a letter that hard copies could be requested from us.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that, but having reviewed the fee requests in this case I can guarantee you that the cost of sending out paper copies to the folks who don't have computers won't be a material incremental cost in the management of this case.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Who's our next employee?

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	Page 18
1	MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, the it would be
2	Mr. Gordon Hall, H-A-L-L.
3	THE COURT: Right. Mr. Hall, are you on the
4	phone? Mr. Hall?
5	COURTCALL OPEATOR: There is no appearance for
6	Mr. Hall, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Griffiths, with Mr. Hall
8	having not appeared on the phone I'm going to consider that
9	matter to have been resolved in the GUC Trust favor or GM's
10	favor.
11	MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: So let's move on to the next one,
13	please.
14	MR. GRIFFITHS: It would be Mr. Stanley Jack,
15	J-A-C-K.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jack, are you on the phone?
17	MR. JACK: Yes, I am, sir.
18	THE COURT: Where are you located, Mr. Jack?
19	MR. JACK: I'm located in the upper peninsula of
20	Michigan.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Would you like to be heard on
22	this matter further? I think we were together on the phone
23	some weeks ago.
24	MR. JACK: Yes, we were.
25	I guess, Your Honor, I just one comment.

THE COURT: Sure, go ahead, please.

MR. JACK: Okay, thank you.

I, you know, listened to the conversation this morning, and yes, I did receive the DVD where it does say the corporation, you know, can change the contract just under part and have no consideration. It doesn't say no consideration for the employee, but they don't come and ask if you agree or sign another document saying that you agree with the change.

But I guess the problem I really have with the whole thing is I go back to my pension to where the corporation, the size for the corporation has the ability to give you a letter and basically force you out knowing I was sitting there with 30 plus years -- 30 and a half years and pressured to retire, and at that point take 50 percent of my pension, and if I was able to work for another six years I'd get 100 percent. That doesn't make sense. I mean that I should lose 50 percent of what I worked for and I worked for 30 plus years and that's what happens.

And I'm not an attorney and I don't know what the legal part of this is, but it is just very frustrating to see that the corporation can just get away with doing that. I mean, I know they're trying to save money, but they're doing it on -- you know, for years my whole career they told me the people of the corporation are their major asset.

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Well guess what, as soon as I, you know, they get rid of me it's like I'm the biggest liability they ever had, and it's just so disheartening to think that our legal system just allows this to happen to people, and it looks like it's just going to continue with other companies as it goes on, and I don't know when it stops.

But I wouldn't wish this on anybody to have to work all these years and then have this happen to them. It's just so disheartening and it's unbelievable what it puts a family through. And I'm living in the UP of Michigan, so it has something to do with having half of my retirement and trying to make a decent life go on, my golden years I guess for my wife and I.

But I just ask the Court to give it some consideration, but I don't believe I have any legal grounds, I'm not sure. But any ways that's all I have to say, sir.

THE COURT: Well, I well understand your concerns, Mr. Jack. There isn't much I can do about the way corporations treat their employees across the country generally. I can focus on the issues in General Motors.

I heard you talk about your pension. Do you understand that this motion doesn't affect your pension but only affects your medical benefits and your life insurance?

MR. JACK: Well, I actually have two claims. the one claim I had -- was for my pension.

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Page 21 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. JACK: I mean, I had two claims -- I had two 3 -- I actually had two claims submitted. 4 THE COURT: Fair enough. 5 Mr. Griffiths, I may or may not have been right 6 when I asked Mr. Jack that question. Why don't you respond 7 generally if you would like to. MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, specifically with 8 9 respect to pensions obviously Your Honor is correct that the 10 omnibus objections in the hearing today don't relate to 11 pensions, pensions were assumed by New GM pursuant to the agreement whereby New GM acquired all of Old GM's assets --12 13 or good assets. 14 Your Honor, specifically with respect to 15 Mr. Jack's complaint, it appears that Mr. Jack's -- Mr. Jack 16 had the option to either take early retirement towards the 17 end of his career or alternatively faced the prospect of 18 termination of his employment. And my understanding is that 19 the way the GM pensions vest you require a certain number of 20 years of service in order for the pension to vest in, you 21 know, to the full amount that would be possible. 22 Because GM decided to terminate Mr. Jack's 23 employment or to offer him a voluntary retirement -- or a 24 so-called voluntary retirement he didn't fulfill the 25 requirements to vest his pension benefits in full.

I don't believe that constitutes a claim that can be allowed under the Bankruptcy Code, and I don't think Mr. Jack has fulfilled his obligations in terms of discharging the claim.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jack, any further comment?

MR. JACK: I guess -- no, I don't, Your Honor, I

guess I don't want to waste anybody's time on this. No, I

don't. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jack, Mr. Griffiths, I'm going to do it a little differently this time so that the folks who are on the phone at this point have comfort that I've individually thought about each one of their claims.

I am going to incorporate my earlier dictated rulings on these same issues so I don't have to repeat them over and over again. But as a refresher, if you will, this motion affects medical and life insurance benefits that are called in the law employee welfare plans as contrasted as different from pensions. The pensions are being honored as a matter of bankruptcy law or as a practical matter because the pensions are satisfied by trust and because the commitments with respect to the pensions were taken over by New GM.

So here there isn't much that I as the bankruptcy judge with Old GM -- with the company that's now called Motors Liquidation Company can do about pensions.

On the medical and life insurance benefits the legal issue is whether when the employee was working -- and I recognize that there's a gray area when the employee worked for part of his or her time when there was no right to change the benefits, and part of the time when there was -- but the issue is whether the employee was on notice and kept working when GM reserved the right to modify the plans.

It appears that in your case, Mr. Jack, for the entirety of the time that you were employed GM had reserved the right to change your benefits, and under a case out of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals called Sprague versus General Motors, which is controlling on me, or which is at least the controlling precedent in this area, those become part of your contract and therefore your contract includes General Motors's right to change the benefits, which in this case it did.

So fully understanding and respecting the pain that having to rule this way imposes on folks who had worked decades in many cases for GM, I'm compelled to disallow your benefits claim, that is the insurance and the medical benefits claim, making it clear that this is in no way intended to affect your pension.

I'm sorry I can't do more for you, Mr. Jack, other than to tell you that I've carefully considered your contentions.

Page 24 MR. JACK: Well, thank you, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. You can either stay on the 3 phone or drop off as you prefer, Mr. 4 MR. JACK: Jack I'll drop off. Thank you. 5 THE COURT: Very good. Next one, please, Mr. 7 MR. GRIFFITHS: Griffiths Your Honor, the next claimant would be Timothy J. Kuechenmeister, 8 9 K-U-E-C-H-E-N-M-E-I-S-T-E-R. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kuechenmeister, are you on 11 the phone? Mr. Kuechenmeister? CourtCall, do we show 12 Mr. Kuechenmeister as having -- as being on the phone? 13 COURTCALL OPERATOR: Your Honor, his line 14 disconnected. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, maybe it's because he got 16 tired of listening to me or maybe because he heard my ruling 17 with respect to Mr. Jack. But under these circumstances, Mr. Griffiths, I 18 19 have to rule in his case the same way I ruled with respect to Mr. Jack. 20 21 MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor. 22 The following claimant would be Mr. Glenn C. 23 Kuntz, K-U-N-T-Z. 24 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Kuntz, are you on the phone? 25 MR. KUNTZ: Judge Gerber, my name Glenn Kuntz.

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	Page 25
1	THE COURT: Okay.
2	MR. KUNTZ: I'm sorry, sir.
3	THE COURT: No, just speak a little louder if you
4	don't mind, Mr. Kuntz, because the phone line is a little
5	weak. Where are you calling from?
6	MR. KUNTZ: Calling from Dayton, Ohio.
7	THE COURT: Okay. And am I right that you and I
8	have spoken before?
9	MR. KUNTZ: Yes, sir.
10	THE COURT: Okay. Would you like to be heard
11	again in light of the new information?
12	MR. KUNTZ: I would like to be heard.
13	THE COURT: Go ahead, please.
14	MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Judge, I was an unclassified
15	executive employee with 35 years at GM, and those years are
16	from 1953 to 1988.
17	THE COURT: Pause, please. Did you say 1953 like
18	during the Korean War?
19	MR. KUNTZ: Yes, 1-9-5-3.
20	THE COURT: Okay. And the date the year of
21	your retirement again, please.
22	MR. KUNTZ: 1988.
23	THE COURT: Okay. Continue, please.
24	MR. KUNTZ: Okay. And I'd just like to comment
25	that nothing in that Smolinsky declaration disk that I

received speaks to unclassified executive employees.

Also there's no reference to special early retirement, and that is exactly the basis that I left GM. I closed the Fisher Guide (ph) plant in O'Leary, Ohio in 1988 and was told I could retire. I was told my life insurance was fully in effect for life when I retired in 1988, period. That's exactly what I was told. Basically I see that as a retirement contract regarding my life insurance.

I'm now 77 years old and I base my wife's future at my passing on the life insurance that GM promised. If I could get comparable life insurance now with my current health questions it would cost me at least \$3,000 a month, which my pension cannot cover. And I just think with GM's current profit it seems like they could easily fund my claim for life insurance.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Griffiths, do you want to respond?

MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, Your Honor, I'm mindful of Your Honor's ruling with respect to Ms. Bogue and the fact that Mr. Kuntz started work in 1953.

And it's worth noting that the -- in the folder we provided you with a summary plan descriptions at Item B the General Motors insurance program, at least from the earliest date I have before we which is 19 I think 62, was split between employees who earned either below \$750 a month or

above \$750 a month. I'm not aware of the classification that Mr. Kuntz refers to in terms of an unclassified salaried employee; however, it would make sense to continue the claim to determine whether we could find any documents going back to 1953.

Although Your Honor has ruled repeatedly with respect to the life insurance program that GM did have the right to amend or modify the program, and therefore it's going to be difficult for the estate to find some sort of common ground with Mr. Kuntz if he believes that he's entitled to life insurance in full.

THE COURT: I agree; however, this is the way I see the issues involving Mr. Kuntz.

First, if he started his employment as early as 1953 there are a lot of similarities between his situation and Ms. Bogue as you recognize, Mr. Griffiths, so we need to find out what the document said in the period from 1953 until 1963, which is now the earliest time that you have the documents.

Secondly, if you haven't already done so I'd like and Mr. Kuntz to trade the documents that each of you believes were exchanged when he retired, which I think if I heard him right was in 1988, to make sure you have them all. And if there is a remaining disagreement at the time then I'll decide it under the law.

Page 28 1 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. GRIFFITHS: 2 THE COURT: Mr. Kuntz, was the sound quality of 3 the phone good enough for you to hear everything I had to 4 say? 5 MR. KUNTZ: Yes, I can hear you fine, I'm sorry if 6 I'm not coming across well. 7 THE COURT: Okay. So here's what we're doing, I'm 8 not ruling on it today. You and Mr. Griffiths, the lawyer 9 for motors liquidation is going to find what documents exist 10 for the period from 1953 to 1963 like he's going to do for 11 Ms. Boque who was on the phone earlier, and also if you have any documents that you were given when you retired in 1988 12 13 you should give them to Mr. Griffiths, and if you and he can't agree on how your claim should be addressed I'll 14 15 decide it under the law. 16 So this matter is going to be continued. And once 17 again you're free to participate by phone. 18 MR. KUNTZ: Judge, can I add one more comment? THE COURT: Of course. 19 20 MR. KUNTZ: I heard what Ms. Bogue said, and to my 21 knowledge I never saw any of these working GM pamphlets, 22 including the one -- the last one listed from 1977. 23 THE COURT: All right. Well, the fact that you 24 may not have seen them may or may not make a difference 25 depending on whether they were available to you.

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1	understand your position in that regard, but I'm not going
2	to decide it today.
3	At this point I want you to trade information with
4	Mr. Griffiths so that you guys can agree on what the facts
5	are, if possible, and then I'll decide what to do about it.
6	MR. KUNTZ: Thank you very much.
7	THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Kuntz. Same thought, you
8	can either stay on the line or drop off if you prefer.
9	MR. KUNTZ: I think I will stay on for at least a
10	little bit longer.
11	THE COURT: Fair enough.
12	Okay, Mr. McClain, is he next?
13	MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: George McClain?
15	MR. MCCLAIN: I'm here, my name is George McClain.
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	MR. MCCLAIN: I'm in Little Rock, Arkansas.
18	THE COURT: You're in Arkansas?
19	MR. MCCLAIN: Yes.
20	THE COURT: In Little Rock?
21	MR. MCCLAIN: Yes.
22	THE COURT: Okay. Would you like to be heard,
23	Mr. McClain, now that we have more documents available?
24	MR. MCCLAIN: Yes, I would, please.
25	THE COURT: Go ahead.

Pg 30 of 115 Page 30 MR. MCCLAIN: I have a little statement I'd like to make. THE COURT: Yep. MR. MCCLAIN: In Attachment A to both of my claim forms I presented valid evidence to the Court of both oral and written contractual obligations covering the healthcare and life insurance benefits I was to receive by accepting early retirement at age 61 in 1984. The written offer to me contained a document that specifically stated, quote, "Complete details regarding benefit plan continuation privileges are contained in the enclosed booklet, your benefits and retirement." The enclosed booklet I received did not contain a reservation of rights clause. The debtors have not disputed or denied two important facts. The statement about complete details being contained in the enclosed booklet, or that the -- your benefits and retirement booklet provided to me did not contain the reservation clause. On the contrary in item 19, pages 9 and 10 of the debtor's reply filed June 5th, 2012 they use the word "most" in referring to the debtor's handbooks that contained the reservation of rights clause. Not the word "all" but the word "most."

reservation of rights clause was added in 1985 in later

The debtors go on in item 19 to point out that the

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Page 31 1 additions of the your benefit and retirement booklet. But I 2 was retired in 1984. 3 I also provided the Court a letter dated May 30, 4 2008 from Metropolitan Life confirming that the group life 5 insurance certificates do not contain any language reserving the right to change the plan or policy provisions. 7 I respectfully request the Court to follow legal 8 precedent and rule that any omission, error, or ambiguity in 9 the offer made to me by the debtors be interpreted adversely 10 to the debtors. 11 That's all I have to say, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. McClain. 12 13 Mr. Griffiths, would you like to respond? 14 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor. Your 15 Honor, in your folder containing the employee replies at tab 16 6 you'll find Mr. McClain's reply, and --17 THE COURT: Well, I have a tab 6, but it's monstrously thick. Can you help me find the --18 19 MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor, if you turn to 20 page, I think it's the PDF at page 138, that's the Exhibit A 21 that Mr. McClain is referring to, which is the summary plan 22 description relating to his -- his retirement. 23 THE COURT: The page 138 I have --24 MR. GRIFFITHS: Oh, excuse me, Your Honor, page --25 THE COURT: -- is Mr. --

Page 32 1 MR. GRIFFITHS: Page 33. 2 THE COURT: 33? 3 MR. GRIFFITHS: Yeah. In the top right-hand 4 corner. 5 MR. MCCLAIN: Mr. Griffiths, what document are you 6 referring to? 7 THE COURT: I have page 33 of 138, is that what 8 you're referring to, Mr. Griffiths? 9 MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor. If I could just 10 direct your attention to the language. 11 Although Mr. McClain has noted that the summary plan description doesn't contain reservation of rights, this 12 13 is the type of language that we're referring to that we've 14 pointed out to Mr. McClain both over the telephone and in 15 the reply, and if I may just read for the record the 16 language, and for your benefit, Mr. McClain, I'm going read 17 this. We're referring to the reply that was filed to your claim by General Motors, and at page 33. You may not have 18 page numbering on your document, I'm not sure, but I'll read 19 20 the specific reservation of rights clause. And it says: 21 "Each of the benefit plans has its own terms and 22 conditions, which in all respects control the eligibility 23 and the payment of benefits mentioned and the payment of benefits is conditioned of course on your eliqibility to 24 25 receive them. From -- and from time to time you may receive

Page 33 1 information concerning changes in your benefits." 2 So this makes clear that by its own terms the 3 summary plan description requires you to refer to the underlying plan documents, and it specifically refers to the 4 5 fact that benefits can be changed. 6 THE COURT: And you're saying --7 MR. MCCLAIN: May I respond to that, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes, after I ask a question to 8 9 Mr. Griffiths. 10 And you're saying that the underlying benefit 11 plans do have that reservation of rights clearly? 12 MR. GRIFFITHS: Correct, Your Honor, going back 13 now 50 years. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Now you can speak, Mr. McClain? 15 MR. MCCLAIN: But it was not in the -- your 16 benefits and retirement booklet handed to me in 1984, which 17 supposedly complained -- contained complete details regarding the continuation privileges of the healthcare and 18 19 life insurance. It just simply was not in the written offer 20 and acceptance and documents that I received and agreed to 21 when I accepted early retirement, and they acknowledge that it was added to that booklet in 1985 in later editions. 22 23 THE COURT: Okay. Well here I think I understand 24 the issue then, and while I think I know what the law would 25 be I may need a clarification or I may not.

Mr. Griffiths, if the document that you read to me was in existence when Mr. McClain retired I'm going to rule unfortunately for Mr. McClain that GM did have the right to change it.

The question I need your help on, if you can give it to me today and if it can't be resolved today so that Mr. McClain understanding it then we'll just have another phone call, is was what you read to me in existence when he retired in 1984?

MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, Your Honor. And if I can just refer you to the affidavit or the declaration rather of Mr. Smolinsky there is the similar booklet dating from November 1977 at Exhibit L, and page 3 contains a similar reservation of rights language, which was the reason we put these summary plan descriptions on file so that employees who are referring to earlier copies of benefit plans that they may not be able to otherwise provide can refer to these copies as examples of what they would have received.

MR. MCCLAIN: But they were not provided to me.

THE COURT: Well, all right. With so many people on the phone and in the courtroom I can't sort this out now, but what -- we'll have one more phone call where the key documents will be shown to me with an explanation as to when they came into effect. If they were available to you Mr. McClain I can't help you. If there -- if you -- is your

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contention that they weren't available to you or you didn't see them on the day you retired?

MR. MCCLAIN: As far as I know I've never received anything but the benefits and retirement booklet. That was the only thing ever provided to me.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what I want you to do. I'm not sure if I have an issue of fact here or not. I want you to send Mr. Griffiths, with a copy to the Court, the booklet that you've got. I want you to make sure that you guys agree on what you got and what you didn't get. And Mr. Griffiths, you're free to show me stuff that was available to him whether or not you're contending that he got it, and then I'll rule in the next phone call. I can't deal with it today.

MR. MCCLAIN: May I say one thing, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes, you can.

MR. MCCLAIN: My original claim included the complete copy of the booklet provided to me in 1984, and Mr. Griffiths has reproduced it but he never comments on it. They comment on later editions, but they never comment on the edition that I got that I submitted and that he has.

THE COURT: Well, I think we have ships passing in the night here, because I think Mr. Griffiths thinks he was commenting on earlier ones and we have a breakdown in communication here through no fault of anybody's.

Page 36 But the practical problem I have, Mr. McClain, is 1 2 I got two thick books that look like phone books here, and I can't get to the bottom of it in fairness to both sides in 3 4 this call with this pile of stuff and still be fair to 5 everybody. So I need you guys to get on the same page, or 6 if you can't to agree to disagree, and if you do agree to 7 disagree I'll do my job and rule. MR. MCCLAIN: All right, Your Honor, and I will 8 9 contact him and send him another copy if he needs another 10 сору. 11 THE COURT: Or you guys can get on the phone and you can agree on what's there and what's not. I don't think 12 13 you need to send him more stuff unless you guys need to, but 14 I'm trying to give you your day in court and still comply 15 with the law, and --16 MR. MCCLAIN: I appreciate it very much, Your 17 Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Good enough. Thanks. All right, next one, please, Mr. Griffiths? 19 20 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor, it would be 21 Mr. David Robertson, R-O-B-E-R-T-S-O-N. 22 THE COURT: Are you on the phone, Mr. Robertson? 23 Mr. Robertson? 24 Okay. With Mr. Robertson not being on the phone 25 your motion to disallow is granted, Mr. Griffiths.

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1	MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	The following claimant will be Mr. Joseph C.
3	Singer, S-I-N-G-E-R.
4	THE COURT: Right. Mr. Singer, are you on the
5	phone?
6	MR. SINGER: Yes, I am, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Would you like to be heard in light of
8	the new documents that are now available?
9	MR. SINGER: Yes, I would.
10	THE COURT: Go ahead, please.
11	MR. SINGER: I started with General Motors in 1951
12	and I retired in September
13	THE COURT: I got noise problems. Did you say '51
14	like during the Korean War or '61 when
15	MR. SINGER: No, no
16	THE COURT: President Kennedy was I'm sorry?
17	MR. SINGER: 1951, and the
18	THE COURT: 1-9-5-1.
19	MR. SINGER: 5-1.
20	THE COURT: Okay.
21	MR. SINGER: And I required in 1991, 40 years of
22	service.
23	THE COURT: Forty years of service.
24	MR. SINGER: Yes.
25	THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SINGER: When I retired it was a limbo five (ph) retirement. and it was offered because they were tried to get a number of people to retire at that time so they had me sign the condition of early retirement, and they said that the only way this could be (indiscernible - 00:41:53) is if I would actually accept the conditions of early the retirement. They said this plan was amended by the salaried retirement program approved by the General Motors Management Committee.

And they further stated in another paragraph that the early retirement offer and my acceptance of this special retirement offer constitutes and the entire and only agreement between me and General Motors. I have no other agreement with them.

And it went on to state that I was subject to penalties if I would try to come back to work or do anything else. And they also mentioned that what I should do is contact an attorney before I sign this. Advice of attorney was make sure you get everything in writing. So I did.

Limbo five stated that all of my benefits will be for life and (indiscernible - 00:42:47) reduced and it said that several places. A supplemental life benefit now will be (indiscernible - 00:42:53) reduced for life for executives who retire under the provisions of limbo five, and they've stated that twice in that particular item.

They also gave me an authorization of monthly benefits, and in that they stated again that my life insurance, my supplemental life insurance in full for life. Then later in March of 20 -- March 29, 1993 they also sent me a letter that said this ultimate amount remains in effect for the rest of your life, and it's provided by General Motors at no cost to you. So at least three of four times they said for the rest of my life, they said that the program was amended in (indiscernible - 00:43:37) and it was amended by the executive committee, and I have it in writing. Now, I -- if I would have violated this General Motors -- if I tried to do something other than what they stated they would have had a legal contract on me that said that I couldn't -- couldn't get a new job within General Motors or anything else. So I've lived up to my end of it and now General Motors is saying, well, they didn't have to abide by it. Now, didn't both of us have to abide by this contract? THE COURT: I couldn't hear the very last thing you said, Mr. --MR. SINGER: It seems like I had an agreement by General Motors that both of us had to live to. I lived to my end of it, but General Motors did not. Now, if I violated it I'm sure General Motors

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Pg 40 of 115 Page 40 1 would have taken me to court. 2 I've also supplied that -- that conditions of 3 early retirement. All of this information should be in Mr. Griffiths' hands right now. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Griffiths, do you want to 6 responds? 7 MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, I would just refer to 8 Your Honor's earlier ruling with respect to Ms. Boque in 9 light of Mr. Singer's employment from 1951. 10 We'll attempt to either come to a consensual 11 resolution with respect to his claim or to provide a copy of 12 the summary plan description from the commencement of his 13 employment. 14 Suffice it to say that Mr. Singer argues that his 15 welfare benefits became vested at the time he took early 16 retirement. The provisions of GM's early retirement 17 programs provided that while benefits may have been provided 18 earlier at the time of the early retirement they never 19 vested in full and could amended or terminated at any time 20 in accordance with the underlying plan documents. 21 But again, I would suggest this is a debate for 22 another day pending the GUC Trust locating copies of a 23 summary plan description from -- from the late '40s or the 24 early '50s.

Okay.

THE COURT:

MR. SINGER: Well, I don't have a problem with the description in the early '40s or '50s, my concern is that when I signed this agreement, which you have, it says conditions of early retirement and it stated that this was amended by the salaried retirement program by General Motors' committee. So they amended that program.

So even if it was and if it did state that this was amended on the conditions of my early retirement, and it's stated by my acceptance of this that I had no other agreement with General Motors and this is the only agreement I have.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SINGER: This is a violation of that earlier agreement, I don't care if it's in the pamphlet, they knocked it out right there by my conditions of early retirement.

THE COURT: All right. I think I understand the legal issue, but I don't have all legal facts I need to get my arms around it yet.

I don't think Motors Liquidation is contending that it has the ability to rewrite the contract or -- of course it has breached it by -- if there is an agreement it may have breached it, which is why you have claims, but the underlying issue is what was your contract, and that involves two things.

Page 42 One, which puts you in the same category as Ms. Boque, and I think it was one other, perhaps Mr. Kuntz. MR. GRIFFITHS: Mr. Kuntz, yes. THE COURT: Which is we have to find out what the documents provided in the early part of your working career, Mr. Singer, from 1951 until 1963. The second issue is that you're saying in substance that the papers that you signed or that were available to you when you retired in 1991 trumped any earlier agreement. I don't know whether that's true or not without looking at them, but when you have the back and forth with Mr. Griffiths over the next several weeks let make sure that we have our arms around the right papers, and then hopefully I won't have as many people on the phone and in the courtroom and I can give you a more definitive answer at that time. But the bottom line is I'm not going to rule on it today, and I take the you follow all of that, Mr. Singer? MR. SINGER: Yes, I am not (indiscernible -00:48:06) anything, I'm sure maybe some place I did receive a booklet, I don't know for sure, but I'm sure it was probably in there. I'm just saying that the conditions that I retired under trump that booklet. THE COURT: Yeah, I understood that, that was the

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Page 43 1 second contention I was talking about. 2 MR. SINGER: Okay. 3 THE COURT: And I'll -- and I'll focus on that when we have it next before us. 4 5 MR. SINGER: Okay, Your Honor, thank you. 6 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 7 Next after Mr. Singer, is that Mr. Sterett? 8 MR. GRIFFITHS: Mr. Sterett, yes, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Sterett, I'm sorry. Are you on the 10 phone, Mr. Sterett? 11 MR. STERETT: Hello, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah, I hear you. Where are you 12 13 calling from, Mr. Sterett? 14 MR. STERETT: Detroit, Michigan. 15 THE COURT: Detroit, okay. And would you like to 16 be heard today? 17 MR. STERETT: Yes. 18 THE COURT: Go ahead, please. 19 MR. STERETT: I actually have nothing much to say 20 in addition to what I've already provided except that my 21 appeal to the Court is basically a moral one, and apparently 22 there's been a ruling that set a precedence that as you 23 spoke earlier, the right to -- GM reserving the right to 24 change. I didn't know if that had been morally tested. 25 I made decisions affecting the rest of my life,

Page 44 particularly with healthcare when I took an early retirement and it was based on the conditions presented to me at the time; however, Mr. Griffiths and I both have reviewed my contract on exit and it does contain the clause right to change -- reserve the right to change. So I just wanted to make that comment more of a moral issue, and I had heard earlier. I signed the same conditions that I would not work for General Motors again, and I've held up my end of the bargain and they have not. So --THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. STERETT: -- I rest my case, I just wanted to 13 make that comment. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Griffiths, do you want to comment? MR. GRIFFITHS: No, Your Honor, thank you. THE COURT: All right. Well, I appreciate the candor and integrity by which you argued that, Mr. Sterett. You raised a moral issue, which is something which we judges wrestle with all the time and which I've personally wrestled with I don't 22 know how many times over the last 12 years. Obviously I 23 have a moral sense of what I would like to do, but at the same time I've gotten an oath to comply with the law, and as a practical matter all I can do is make sure that we've left

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Page 45 no stone unturned in making sure that we have our arms 1 2 around the whole contract and that I've given everybody a 3 full and fair opportunity to be heard. 4 After I've done that, as a practical matter, 5 there's only one thing left that I can do which is to comply 6 with the law. And having done all of that, and because of 7 what the law requires, I am with regret required to rule 8 your way the same way that I ruled with respect to Mr. Jake 9 and a fair number of folks in the hearings that we've had 10 before today. 11 So with regret I am compelled to disallow this claim for the reasons that I articulated at greater length 12 13 with respect to Mr. Jake today. And I'm sorry, Mr. Sterett, 14 but that's got to be the ruling. And you're free to either 15 stay on the phone or leave. 16 MR. STERETT: No, I'll get off, Your Honor, and 17 thank you for your consideration. 18 THE COURT: Okay, I appreciate your courtesy. 19 Is the last one Mr. David Volpe? 20 MR. GRIFFITHS: Correct, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Volpe, are you on the 22 phone? 23 MR. VOLPE: Yes, Your Honor, I am. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Would you like to be heard? 25 MR. VOLPE: Yes, I would.

THE COURT: Go ahead, please.

MR. VOLPE: I had originally argued from the perspective that when I initiated, negotiated, and accepted an early retirement in 2001 that General Motors and I had a contract that had certain provisions, and those provisions were a certain pension that I had earned, certain welfare benefits that I had earned, and the fact that General Motors has ex post facto come in and changed that agreement that we had, I didn't think was right and I didn't think was legal.

It appears as though a precedence has been set that allows them to do that, and I guess I'll have to direct my efforts towards my elected officials to make sure that others in the future don't fall prey to this.

But that notwithstanding, I did take a detailed look at the documents that were sent to us on CD by Mr. Griffiths and the debtor's attorneys, and I'm have having a little difficulty finding exactly what Mr., I believe it's Smolinsky, who signed that latest document is referring to.

If I may -- my dates of employment again were August 18th, 1969, Vietnam era, through -- actually my retirement date was November 1st, 2002. If you go to document -- the document and go to Exhibit M, and they reference page 32, that is actually page 413 of 415, and I would ask Mr. Griffiths if he's in agreement with that, if

we have the same documents and the same numbering scheme.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll ask Mr. Griffiths to respond to it after you've made any further points you make.

MR. VOLPE: Okay. The -- when I go to page 413 of the PDF document -- 413 of 415, there are three paragraphs there and they do not say that General Motors reserves the right to change, modify, terminate any of the language that we've been talking about.

Furthermore, when I go to Exhibit L, which is the one just before that, the cover document references page number 3 of that document, and on my CD that is PDF page 344 out of 415, and that also does not say anything about General Motors reserving the right to change, modify, terminate benefits.

And I picked these two out because they were the last in the list of exhibits and would be closer to -- my tenor started as I said in 1969. You may remember I indicated I was a co-op student that went to grad student on a fellowship and actually started my active career in the fall of 1975, so -- after schooling was done.

So these documents are not supportive of what the cover document is saying, and unless I'm reading it incorrectly I would ask for a clarification on that.

THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. Mr. Griffiths?

MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, Mr. Volpe has

correctly referred to the reservation of rights language contained in the summary plan descriptions. With respect to the most recent plan he referred to, Exhibit L, does note that each of the benefit plans has its own terms and conditions, which in all respects control the eligibility and payment of the benefits mentioned.

THE COURT: Mr. Griffiths, I know you've read these many times, but you have to slow down, because the people who are on the phone haven't heard them as often as I have.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, it was simply to note that Mr. Volpe's argument is that he would essentially like to see the underlying plan documents, and if -- if that's what Mr. Volpe would like to see in order to resolve his claim to conclusively understand that the benefits could be amended or modified then the GUC Trust is more than happy to provide Mr. Robertson with -- or I'm sorry -- Mr. Volpe with copies of the underlying plan documents. I've reviewed the terms of the plan documents and can confirm that they do contain the right to amend or modify. But if Mr. Volpe requires those documents to achieve closure in the case then the GUC Trust is more than happy to provide them to him.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I know the language you're talking about, but let me put the question to Mr. Volpe.

Pg 49 of 115 Page 49 1 Mr. Volpe, would you feel a little more 2 comfortable if Mr. Griffiths showed you the exact language 3 and I didn't resolve it today? MR. VOLPE: Actually not, Your Honor, what I'd 4 5 like to do is read the document -- the page of the exhibit that is referenced having that language. Because I'm 7 looking at it, I'm looking at page 344 of the PDF document which is page 3 of Exhibit L, and to my way of reading it I 8 don't see the language. 9 10 THE COURT: Are you referring, Mr. Griffiths to 11 the language that says, "Each of the benefit plans has its own terms and conditions, which in all respects control the 12 eligibility and payment of benefits mentioned"? 13 14 MR. GRIFFITHS: Correct, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Volpe, that is the language upon 16 which ruled adversely to some of the other folks, including 17 Mr. Jack today, and I think it was Mr. -- what was it Sterett today? 18 19 Do you have something else to bring to my 20 attention, Mr. Volpe? MR. VOLPE: Your Honor, I also had submitted on 21 22 the 21st of June, subsequent to our last hearing on 23 June 14th, a document that was provided to me at retirement

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indicating that, if I may read an excerpt, that the -- "Our

insurance records as of the date of this letter," which is

Page 50 1 October 7th, 2002 -- "show the continuing life insurance has 2 now fully reduced to the ultimate amount of \$80,945. 3 ultimate amount will remain in effect for the rest of your 4 life and is provided by General Motors at no cost to you." 5 End of excerpt. 6 THE COURT: Right, but the next sentence also 7 says, "This is not a quarantee of the coverage amount." 8 MR. VOLPE: That is correct. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Griffiths, further 10 comments? 11 MR. GRIFFITHS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. 12 13 Mr. Volpe, with regret I'm going to have to rule 14 the same way in your case as I did with respect to Mr. Jack, 15 and kind of incorporate what I said before. 16 The issue as a matter of law is getting our arms 17 around what was each employee's contract during the time 18 that he worked and at the time when he retired. And the 19 language from that page 3, which made specific reference to 20 -- and I'm going to read it again so there's no ambiguity. 21 "Each of the benefits plans has its own terms and 22 conditions, which in all respect control the eligibility and 23 payments of benefits mentioned." Kind of consider an emphasis on the word "control." And for those people who 24

worked during the time that old GM had reserved the right to

Page 51 1 modify my hands are tied. 2 So all I want you to know is that I've considered 3 your claim and your contentions as fairly as I could, but 4 that's got to be my ruling. 5 MR. VOLPE: I appreciate that. I was hoping for 6 possibly an epiphany and maybe a John Roberts moment, but as 7 I said earlier, I will direct my efforts towards my elected 8 officials to see if the laws can be changed that you can 9 interpret in that direction to save future employees and 10 retirees a lot of the heartache and heartbreak that we've 11 gone through with this. 12 THE COURT: Well, I'm not allowed to get involved 13 in politics, but I certainly -- as a citizen and not a judge 14 you have my support. 15 MR. VOLPE: I thank you again. 16 THE COURT: Okay, fair enough. 17 Is that the last of yours, Mr. Griffiths? 18 MR. GRIFFITHS: It is, Your Honor. 19 And just to note that the GUC Trust appreciates the Court's time in attempting to resolve these matters, and 20 21 of course we have repeatedly tried to settle many of these 22 -- these matters and will continue to do so, but 23 unfortunately it isn't always possible. THE COURT: I understand. 24 25 MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, I have the pleasure of

Page 52 1 introducing Katie L. Cooperman of Dickstein Shapiro to 2 handle the following item on the agenda, I believe the 281st 3 omnibus objection to claims in relation to insufficient 4 documentation. It's an uncontested omnibus objection. 5 THE COURT: Fair enough. Ms. Cooperman? 6 MS. COOPERMAN: Good morning, Your Honor, Katie 7 Cooperman from Dickstein Shapiro on behalf of the GUC Trust. 8 Today we have one uncontested omnibus objection. 9 It's the 281st omnibus objection to 16 claims based on insufficient documentation. Of those 16 claims we've 10 11 adjourned 3 and withdrawn 3. 12 Today we're going forward with the remaining ten 13 claims on an uncontested basis. 14 Unless the Court has any questions we'll submit an 15 order to chambers. 16 THE COURT: That's fully satisfactory, 17 Ms. Cooperman, your objections are sustained and you can get 18 the paperwork to my chambers as soon as convenient. 19 MS. COOPERMAN: Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. 21 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 We also have Mr. Rachmuth in the court this 23 morning from Gersten Savage LLP who is handling the Anderson -- or the motion of award of attorneys' fees in relation to 24 25 Anderson Class Counsel.

Page 53 THE COURT: Come on up, folks. Hi, I think you've 1 2 been here before haven't you? 3 MR. RACHMUTH: Yes, Your Honor. Paul Rachmuth, 4 Gersten Savage, I also have in the courtroom with me, A.J. 5 De Bartolomeo. 6 MS. DE BARTOLOMEO: Good morning, Your Honor --7 THE COURT: Good morning. MS. DE BARTOLOMEO: -- A.J. De Bartolomeo. 8 9 MR. RACHMUTH: Sorry. Representing Class --10 THE COURT: You can sit if you don't want to keep 11 standing, Ms. De Bartolomeo. MS. DE BARTOLOMEO: Actually I've been sitting for 12 quite a while, Your Honor, if you don't mind I prefer to 13 stand. 14 15 THE COURT: Fine with me. 16 MR. RACHMUTH: Your Honor, the client that I 17 represent is the Class Counsel in the Anderson class actions 18 lawsuits. 19 There was a protracted case that was settled 20 prepetition, it was a claim that was filed for those unpaid 21 amounts. The law firm, Girard Gibbs, had worked post-22 petition to resolve this resulting in an allowed claim. 23 We had filed with your court a request initially 24 for notice to all the class parties to allow payments for 25 the -- for the Class Counsel. We received 25 responses,

Pg 54 of 115 Page 54 1 mostly positive. We've summarized all those papers in 2 A.J.'s declaration. I'd like to -- if the Court would like we can 3 4 summarize -- allow her to summarize right now. 5 The end result of this is we filed with Your Honor 6 a proposed order allowing for those fees, after putting 7 everybody on notice and receiving no objection from the --8 the debtor is taking no position. And the only comments 9 were from the specific class members. Again, many in 10 support. 11 There were some that were sent directly to law firm that were not send to the Court, we have attached those 12 13 as an exhibit to an affirmation that was filed. I have 14 copies of all the documents. 15 THE COURT: What I'd like to do, folks, is see if 16 there is anybody who's on the phone or in the courtroom who 17 wants to be heard. I know from our earlier proceedings what you did, I'm aware of the no object from the estate and from 18 19 the creditor community. So let's pause for a second. 20 Does anyone want to be heard in opposition to this 21 settlement? Either -- there's no response in the courtroom. 22 Is there anybody on the phone who wants to be heard? 23 Ms. De Bartolomeo, me tentative California style

is to approve your settlement, but if you want to be heard

I'll let you.

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1 MS. DE BARTOLOMEO: Your Honor, my response 2 California style is when the judge rules your way to say 3 thank you very much and sit down and appreciate your time. THE COURT: Okay. Under these circumstances I am 4 5 going to be approved the settlement. 6 I know the haircut that counsel had to take as a 7 consequence of the timing of the prepetition near, but not quite final finalization of the settlement. I know the 8 9 post-petition services you guys performed and I'm satisfied 10 that you did your job and that you were able to slice the 11 baby between representing your class and still being 12 responsible to the needs and concerns of the creditor 13 community in this case. 14 So your request for attorneys' fees is approved. 15 And I'd ask that one of the two of you just deal with the 16 paperwork in getting it to my chambers. 17 MR. RACHMUTH: I have it on -- I have a proposed order that was submitted, I also have it on disk in Word 18 19 format, I will hand it off. 20 THE COURT: Okay, my courtroom deputy is down the 21 hallway and you can just drop it off with her and you can 22 tell her that I approved it. 23 MR. RACHMUTH: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. Have a 25 good flight back.

Page 56 1 MS. DE BARTOLOMEO: Thank you, Your Honor, and 2 thank you for your --3 THE COURT: Have a good day. MS. DE BARTOLOMEO: -- time. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Do we now have anything other 6 than Aurelius? 7 MR. GRIFFITHS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Well, Mr. Griffiths, you and 8 9 anybody who came with you is excused on that. I don't want 10 to take a long break. Let's again at 11 o'clock on 11 Aurelius. We're in recess. 12 (Recess at 10:54 a.m.) 13 THE COURT: Have seat, please. All right, the Aurelius summary judgment motion. 14 15 As always I've read the papers, but we've been 16 through this so many times, and I'm so familiar with things 17 and so are you that let's just go straight into arguments. 18 So, Mr. Friedman, refresh my recollections, I'll 19 hear from you. 20 MR. FRIEDMAN: May id please the Court Edward 21 Friedman, Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman representing 22 Aurelius Investment, LLC. Good morning, Your Honor. 23 This is a motion for summary judgment to dismiss 24 all claims in the amended complaint as against Aurelius 25 Investment. Our motion presents a narrow legal issue.

In this adversary proceeding the GUC Trust seeks subordination, disallowance, or reduction of Nova Scotia guarantee claims. No affirmative relief is sought as against Aurelius Investment or for that matter as against any other defendants.

We submit that because Aurelius Investment has sold all the Nova Scotia notes it owned, because Aurelius Investment no longer has any claim in this case and no longer has any interest in distributions in respect of the guarantee claims, and because Aurelius Investment has nothing to subordinate, disallow, or reduce the claims against our client should be dismissed.

Before jumping into the legal arguments that will be before Your Honor this morning, I would like to be clear concerning what is in dispute and what is not.

There is no dispute that Aurelius Investment sold its entire position in the Nova Scotia notes in April 2011. That fact is set forth in the Aurelius Investment statement of undisputed facts and in paragraph 4 of the GUC Trust counter-statement. The plaintiff confirms that there's no dispute as to that fact.

With respect to legal issues there have been various arguments at various times advanced by the GUC Trust as to why supposedly in its view a former holder of a claim based on publicly traded notes maybe sued for subordination

and related claims.

We have heard a whole series of arguments that have been shown to be without merit or effectively withdrawn or abandoned. I just want to mention them briefly so that if counsel for the GUC Trust when it's his turn wants to stand up and say, no, no, we are pressing that argument, I'll have an opportunity to address it in more detail. Very briefly.

THE COURT: Better yet, why don't you triage the arguments you want to make today to those that you understand the GUC Trust still to be making, and I'll give you the chance to respond if they, contrary to your understanding, raise points that you thought were off the table. That may save a little time.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Okay. Maybe if I may just for the record I'll say in one sentence the arguments that we have seen from the beginning of this adversary proceeding that seem to have been effectively abandoned are one, their argument concerning Sections 5.1 and 5.10 of the plan; two, their related argument concerning the effect of a notice of transfer of claim or the absence of a notice of transfer of claim; and three, their argument that the -- that the claims asserted in this adversary proceeding by the GUC Trust should be viewed as in rem claims.

THE COURT: I didn't understand them to have

dropped the last one, I just didn't understand that to be your fight.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, I think if I understand Your Honor correctly, our position with respect to that last item, which we heard for the first time at the argument on the motion to dismiss on June 15.

Our position very simply is that the GUC Trust claims as against Aurelius Investment are not in rem claims. Aurelius Investment has been named as a defendant in this adversary proceeding, the claims asserted require the filing of an adversary proceeding, which means notice and hearing and to begin with the identification of an appropriate defendant who will be served with -- with process.

So as I read the GUC Trust opposition I don't see the assertion anymore, and I could be mistaken, I don't see the assertion anymore that because in their view somehow these are in rem claims Aurelius Investment should remain as a proper defendant.

I would just add even if the claims were properly viewed as in rem claims the conclusion would be all the more reason why a particular named defendant is actually not necessary or appropriate.

But beyond --

THE COURT: It's your real point isn't it?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Say again?

THE COURT: The second thing you said just as I was interrupting you, that's your real point isn't it?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, our real point, Your Honor, is that Aurelius Investment is not the proper defendant here because for the reasons I was explaining at the very beginning, there's no relief that is requested in the complaint that is available or effective as against Aurelius Investment.

Aurelius Investment at one time owned Nova Scotia notes, and by virtue of Aurelius Investment in the past having been an owner of those notes Aurelius Investment filed a proof of claim. But the record is clear, the facts are undisputed, Aurelius Investment has sold its notes and Aurelius Investment has stated on the record, I myself have stated it repeatedly, Aurelius Investment is not asserting any claim in this case. Aurelius Investment is not seeking any distribution in this case.

The whole point of the GUC Trust amended complaint is to reduce the distributions going to the Nova Scotia noteholders. Since Aurelius is not a Nova Scotia noteholder Aurelius has no interest in the Nova Scotia noteholder guarantee claim and no interest in whatever is resolved concerning the distributions to be provided to noteholders.

In fact I might mention since I know it's on Your Honor's calendar after this argument, we have the question

of a mediation that was proposed by counsel for one of the parties, counsel -- Mr. Reisman. And I have communicated to Mr. Reisman, I don't mind saying it in court, I don't see how Aurelius Investment could participate in a mediation.

The GUC Trust is looking for the defendants to take less in the way of distributions of New GM stock than the defendants believe they are entitled to. And I would imagine that the negotiation in a mediation would be in the nature of the GUC Trust saying our position is that the distributions to the Nova Scotia noteholders should be limited as follows, and the defendants in the mediation would be saying, no, we disagree, you know, we think we're entitled to this full distribution, but for purposes of settlement and mediation we're willing to accept somewhat less.

Aurelius has nothing to say about that. Whatever happens, whatever is resolved it will have no effect on Aurelius.

And by virtue of Aurelius having sold its Nova

Scotia notes in April 2011 we believe that there's no basis
whatsoever for the GUC Trust having filed the adversary
proceeding as against Aurelius and no basis for the GUC

Trust to maintain the claims as against Aurelius.

And that really brings me to what I understand is the main argument now being advanced by the GUC Trust. And

when I say what I understand it's not guesswork, I'm obviously looking at the papers that they filed. And what we see in the GUC Trust opposition, which was filed six days ago this past Friday, what we see is that we are now dealing with a newly minted argument that we have not previously heard from the GUC Trust, even though there's been a period of many months of correspondence, discussions, motion practice concerning whether Aurelius Investment is a proper defendant in this case.

And the argument we now see, this brand new theory, is that according to the GUC Trust by virtue of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), Aurelius Investment is a proper defendant even though it sold its entire position in the Nova Scotia notes, and even though as the GUC Trust acknowledges that sale occurred approximately a year before the adversary proceeding began.

## Rule 25(c) provides:

"That if an interest is transferred an action may be continued by or against the original party unless the Court on motion orders the transferee to be substituted in the action or joined would the original party."

The problem for the GUC Trust is that Rule 25(c) applies in the case of transfers during the action.

Here almost a year before the adversary proceeding was filed Aurelius had sold its Nova Scotia notes and no

longer had any interest in those notes or the guarantee claim associated with them.

The fact is that Rule 25(c), which we are hearing about for the first time last week, is completely inapplicable here and provides no support for the GUC Trust position. The rule only applies in the case of transfers of interest during an action and that did not happen here.

To try to avoid this inescapable conclusion and to try to fit itself into Rule 25(c) the GUC Trust asked the Court to deem the claim objection as part of the adversary proceeding and to consider the filing of the proof of claim and the claim objection and the adversary proceeding to be one proceeding.

The problem with that, Your Honor, is that the claim objection and the adversary proceeding are not the same proceeding. The rules make clear, the case law makes clear, an adversary proceeding is a separate proceeding.

The GUC Trust is seeking relief in the nature of equitable subordination, that relief is being requested, needs to be requested in an adversary proceeding, and that's what they're doing. And they improperly named Aurelius Investment as a defendant in the adversary proceeding, even though Aurelius Investment had no claim in the case, no ownership of notes, no basis for subordination or reduction.

I would note that in the claim objection, whether

that's combined with the adversary proceeding as I understand the GUC Trust is seeking to do, or whether it is heard separately, doesn't matter; combined, separate, it is a separate proceeding. Aurelius Investment is not asking for any relief in connection with the claims objection proceeding. That is what it is. Aurelius Investment has stated on the record that it has no interest in claim number 66265 that it had filed at the time proofs of claim were due to be -- were due to be filed.

We've heard argument from the GUC Trust that if
Aurelius Investment is seeking dismissal in this adversary
proceeding then Aurelius Investment should withdraw the
proof of claim that it filed. But the fact is, and this is
undisputed, Aurelius Investment has no ownership interest in
that proof of claim. We're not aware of any principal
theory argument that would make it appropriate for Aurelius
Investment, after it has sold the note, after it has no
interest in the proof of claim to engage in action regarding
that proof of claim such as filing a withdrawal with respect
to it.

And I'll just reiterate that for the record we believe we have done all that we can be reasonably asked to do with respect to claim number 66265, which is to say we have no interest in it and whatever the GUC Trust is pursuing in the adversary proceeding concerning

Pg 65 of 115 Page 65 1 subordination, reduction of that claim, Aurelius has no 2 interest in that. 3 The -- there are a bunch of other arguments that 4 we see in the GUC Trust papers that I'll mention very 5 briefly. 6 One is that even if the Court agrees with Aurelius 7 Investment that Aurelius Investment is not a proper defendant in this adversary proceeding, the GUC Trust asked 8 9 the Court to allow the claims to continue against Aurelius 10 Investment as a nominal or relief defendant. 11 Those concepts, which we see from time to time in the case law, arise in situations that have absolutely 12 13 nothing to do with the circumstances here. There are cases, for example, cited by the GUC 14 15 Trust where in a claim alleging violations of the securities 16 laws, there is someone other than the wrongdoer who was the 17 recipient of funds, such as the fruits of insider trading, and that person who received the funds is not alleged to 18 have engaged in any wrong doing. But the courts will say by 19 virtue of that person having received ill gotten gained that 20 21 person should be what is sometimes referred to as a relief 22 defendant. But in this case just the opposite is true. 23 There is no relief available as against Aurelius Investment.

> The GUC Trust also points to cases in which courts have permitted defendants to be designated as nominal

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defendants. For example, an agent or an indenture trustee may be a nominal defendant even though it has no economic stake in the outcome. But here Aurelius is not like an indenture trustee or other agent, it's not an appropriate nominal defendant.

Another classic example is a corporation in a shareholder derivative action is viewed as a nominal defendant, a necessary party on the defendant side but not someone against whom claims are being asserted.

Finally the GUC Trust argues if all else fails the Court's equitable powers should be invoked to keep in Aurelius Investment as a defendant.

I find that argument astonishing. If anything, the equities here require that the claims against Aurelius Investment be dismissed right now at long last before Aurelius Investment incurs further legal expenses as a party over and above the tremendous expenses that have been occurred.

The case law -- even the case law relied on by the GUC Trust in its appeal to the Court's equitable powers makes very clear that the equity power of the Bankruptcy Court does not countenance results that are contrary to legal principals.

So to the extent the conclusion is that the claims against Aurelius Investment should be dismissed because

Pg 67 of 115 Page 67 there's no basis for seeking such relief against Aurelius Investment, the Court's equitable powers would not provide a basis for keeping Aurelius Investment in the case. For all of these reasons, obviously all is more fully set forth in our papers, Your Honor, we respectfully submit that the claims in the amended complaint should be dismissed as against Aurelius Investment. Thank you. THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Fisher? MR. FISHER: Good morning, Your Honor, Eric Fisher from Dickstein Shapiro for the GUC Trust. This dialogue between Aurelius and the GUC Trust has been going on for a long time. It took the form of letters and phone calls, then it took the form of a motion to dismiss, and now it's taking the form, Your Honor, of a summary judgment motion. And reducing each side's argument to its bare caricature essentially Aurelius has been saying for a long time we sold our notes in April 2011 let us out, and the GUC Trust has been saying for a long time, you filed a proof of claim, every document filed with the Bankruptcy Court, the claims register, every other public indication says you're

the holder of record of that proof of claim and so we can't

let you out. Reduced to caricatures that's the argument

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And then both sides, Your Honor, tried to find sound legal footing for their positions. And I would say that at the motion to dismiss argument that Your Honor heard both sides were trying to fit square pegs into round wholes. The GUC Trust was arguing that plan provisions 5.1 and 5.10 suggest that Aurelius is a proper party. Your Honor pointed out at the motion to dismiss argument that those plan provisions concern distribution and didn't seem to bear on the question before the Court. I think both parties now agree that that -- that those plan provisions are really besides the point.

Aurelius at that argument and at this argument as well in its papers sites to cases that have nothing to do with the issue before the Court. The kinds of cases that Aurelius relies on for instance are an ERISA case where the case is dismissed because you're supposed to name the plan administrator. Or a federal tort claims act case where the case is dismissed because you're suppose to name the United States not the individual tortfeasor. And cases of that sort.

And so we come to you today with a new argument. It is true in our papers last week was the first time that we raised the issue of Rule 25. And I can tell you that as a team as we continued to cogitate on the issues raised by

Aurelius when we saw Rule 25 it was as though the answer was just staring us right there in the face. Because I think Rule 25 does provide the answer to what had seemed to be an issue as to which it was difficult to find sound legal footing.

Your Honor, Rule 25(c) says, quote, "If an interest is transferred the action may be continued by or against the original party."

So here Aurelius is saying that its interest was transferred and we're saying that this action may be continued by or against Aurelius, the original party.

"Unless the Court on motion orders the transferee to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. The motion must be served as provided in Rule 25(a)(3)."

Obviously, Your Honor, there's been no motion brought under Rule 25(c) to have Aurelius' transferee substituted as the party. The reason no such motion has been brought, among perhaps other reasons that I'm not privy to, but one of the reasons is that Aurelius can't identify the transferee, and as we pointed out to Your Honor at the motion to dismiss argument it would take years of international discovery to perhaps find out who the true beneficial holder is of Aurelius' claim, and then once we find it out under Aurelius' theory of the case that

beneficial holder could sell the claim and then we wouldn't have a party and we'd have to -- we'd have to start over. That's why Rule 25(c) says what it says. It puts the burden of identifying the proper party on the transferor, not in this case on the GUC Trust, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Fisher, Morris Federal Practice seems to say in baby talk in its section on 25(c) that it only applies to transfers occurring during the pendency of the litigation. I understand the practical problem you have, but, you know, Morris Federal Practice doesn't have the ax to grind that your opponent does. How do you respond to that? MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I haven't seen any case law that construes that notion in the same action in some technical way. I mean, I've -- I've seen cases that refer to it in different ways, including cases cited by earliest that talk about it has to be in the same litigation. So they're construing action very narrowly. But I want to try to -- I -- I do think that if there is any weakness in the 25(c) argument it is precisely that issue, and so I want to try to address that as forthrightly as possible. The -- there's no dispute that Aurelius held its proof of claim when the GUC Trust filed its initial objection in this case in July 2010 and when it amended that

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objection in November 2010. That objection sought relief, including re-characterization and equitable subordination.

Then during the interim period after that objection was filed and amended Aurelius sold its notes, such that it was not a holder of notes as of when we commenced the adversary proceeding.

We think that it's clear that these proceedings; the contested matter, claim objection, disallowance proceeding, and the equitable subordination adversary proceeding are the same litigation.

And just to provide some factual examples of that and then, Your Honor, I -- I think I have a case that speaks to the issue as well, but to provide some factual examples the scheduling order in this case is a scheduling order with regard to the claim objection and the adversary proceeding. It's explicit about that.

In the disclosure statement in this case a portion of the disclosure statement was written by Greenberg Traurig so that they were given an opportunity to recite their version of the GUC Trust claim objection. When -- in that section Greenberg Traurig acknowledges that there was a claim of equitable subordination that had been raised in the objection.

So this is, Your Honor, a continuation -- a continuous proceeding. It's all of the same issues.

Mr. Zirinsky at a discovery -- in a discovery dispute before Your Honor said -- and this was a discovery dispute before the GUC Trust commenced its adversary proceeding, that -- that we were contending that the noteholders had acted inequitably with respect to that lockup agreement and that we were seeking equitable subordination. In other words, it -- it was crystal clear before Aurelius sold its notes that this was already a litigation about equitable subordination and about recharacterization.

We also think, Your Honor, that the recharacterization claim was not in any way procedurally defective having been asserted in that original objection, but as we've said many times in an abundance of caution we included it as part of adversary complaint because Greenberg Traurig was not willing to agree that it was properly raised in the context of an objection and said that we would remove it from the adversary at our peril.

So with regard to recharacterization, there's no doubt that this has been one continuous litigation where as early as July 2010 before Aurelius sold its notes while it was still indisputably a holder of notes the recharacterization claim was being litigated.

They -- they sold their -- they sold their notes after discovery was well under way, Your Honor, and that discovery was ultimately by agreement of the parties.

Deemed to be discovery that could be used both in the hearing to be held with regard to the claims objection and the adversary proceeding.

Those are some examples of the facts here that I think suggest that this is one litigation and that -- that Aurelius held its notes while this litigation was still pending.

In terms of legal support, Your Honor, there is a case that we found from the northern district of Texas called In re: Basin Resources. It's a bankruptcy case, 182 B.R. 489.

And what -- what happened in that case was a creditor had filed a proof of claim and then the debtor brought an adversary proceeding seeking to equitably subordinate the proof of claim on the grounds that it arose from a securities.

And when it came to the hearing of the matter the debtor wanted to rely on an admission in the proof of claim, and the evidentiary question was whether that admission in the proof of claim was a judicial admission. And that turned on the question of whether that proof of claim and that adversary complaint were part of the same proceeding.

And the Court ruled that under those circumstances that was the same proceeding. And what the Court said there, I think is equal -- equally applicable to the issue

before the Court today. What the Court said was, quote:

"Although the proof of claim in the instant case was filed in the general bankruptcy case, this adversary is in effect and objection to that claim. If this were merely the usual contested matter involving the objection to the claim there would be no question that the statements in the proof of claim would be judicial admissions.

An objection to claim matters, the proof of claim is seen as the initial pleading. The objection to proof of claim is the responsive pleading. A proceeding to subordinate a claim commenced pursuant to Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code is simply an objection to claim, which has the added procedural and substantive requirements of an adversary proceeding." Close quote.

I think that those principles apply equally here to say that this is one unitary proceeding, Your Honor.

During oral argument, Mr. Friedman said that

Aurelius is not seeking to, quote "get out of" the claim

objection proceeding. Presumably that's because they can't

dispute that they were a holder of notes at the time that

the claim objection was filed.

If that's the case, it just -- it just leads to a nonsensical result where Aurelius is part of a claim allowance proceeding where recharacterization and equitable subordination were raised in the objection and then not part

Pg 75 of 115 Page 75 1 of the adversary proceeding. We -- we don't even --THE COURT: Well, the point you're making would 2 3 have equal validity if whoever got this claim shows up and 4 tries to collect from the estate and then says, uh, uh, uh, 5 you can't equitably subordinate me or disallow me because 6 you didn't bring an adversary proceeding. Then your case 7 would be on all fours. But if you're laying this as a predicate for 25(c) compliance it's a little more of a 8 9 stretch. 10 What -- what you're really saying is you don't 11 want me to forget that Basin case when Joe Eshinese (ph) 12 shows up and says, I want their -- what is it, 138 million 13 bucks worth of --14 MR. FISHER: Yes. 15 THE COURT: -- claim or something like that. 16 I assume you're going to remind me of that case then. 17 MR. FISHER: Of course, Your Honor, but it really 18 matters to us in terms of ensuring that we can get all the 19 relief we think that we'll ultimately be entitled to at the 20 conclusion of trial to have Aurelius as a party and -- and 21 Rule 25(c) is relevant to that. 22 What -- what the Third Circuit said about Rule 23 25(c) in the Luxliner case, 13 F.3d 69, quote "Rule 25(c)

does not require that anything be done after an interest has

been transferred." Close quote.

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The idea being the action just continues against the original party, even though the interest has been transferred. Quote:

"When a defendant corporation has merged with another corporation, for example, the case may be continued against the original defendant and the judgment will be binding on the successor, even if the successor is not named in the lawsuit." Close quote.

That's why we think if Aurelius is legally the right party under Rule 25(c) and the burden is on them to identify who the proper transferee defendant is, and they haven't made a motion under Rule 25(c), and they can't identify who the proper transferee defendant is, we think that by keeping them in, because legally they are the correct party, it just ensures that any judgment we get against them will also be binding on any successor that may come to the Court later.

Now, I understand there may be post judgment due process type challenges to a judgment like that, but we think we would be on much sounder footing if we -- if we litigated to conclusion with Aurelius as the party. And as Your Honor is aware we've done everything we can to try to put the world on notice of this hearing that is scheduled to commence on August 7th.

THE COURT: How as a practical matter do I apply

or enforce 25(c) if Aurelius doesn't know who got it?

MR. FISHER: I -- I think, Your Honor, it -- it -25(c) in a sense is not before the Court because no one has
made a move -- a motion to substitute someone in place of
Aurelius, and that is not the Court's problem; that is
Aurelius' problem. And the law seeks to ensure that someone
who was a party to a litigation is stuck in that litigation
until they're in a position to make a motion to argue that
someone else ought to be substituted or joined with them.
That's what the rule provides.

It wouldn't even necessarily get Aurelius out.

They could make a motion under Rule 25 and then a transferee would be added as a party.

We also think, Your Honor, that our arguments with regard to Rule 25(c) are just more generally consistent with how the bankruptcy rules treat proofs of claim. And for example, under Rule 3006, which relates to withdrawal of claims. That rule provides that:

"If after a creditor has filed a proof of claim an objection is filed thereto, or a complaint is filed against that creditor in an adversary proceeding, or the creditor has accepted or rejected the plan or otherwise has participated significantly in the case, the creditor may not withdraw the claim, except on order of the Court after a hearing on notice to the trustee or debtor in possession and

any creditors' committee." And then it continues.

The idea being that once Aurelius filed it's proof of claim, if it wanted to withdraw that proof of claim after the GUC Trust objection was filed because it sold its notes, it would had to have done so on motion. And again, the reason behind that rule, similar to Rule 25(c), is to put the onus for identifying the correct party in a situation where there's been a transfer while a litigation is pending to put the onus for identifying the correct party on the transferor and not, in this case, on -- on the GUC Trust, Your Honor.

And when -- when we talk about the equities we don't mean equities flying in thin air. We mean simply that because Aurelius could have itself taken steps to identify who its -- who the beneficial holder of its notes are -- is, could have brought a motion under Rule 25(c), could have sought to remove its proof of claim under Rule 3006, because it didn't take any of those measures and the law puts the burden on them, the equities favor a -- a strict enforcement of the principles behind Rule 25(c).

As Your Honor correctly pointed out, we're not abandoning any arguments we've previously made. I said -- I did say at the outset we do think the arguments under 5.1 and 5.10 of the plan are irrelevant, but we're not abandoning the in rem arguments that we made.

Pg 79 of 115 Page 79 It certainly is possible that if the Court were to 1 2 let Aurelius out of the case that we still could, in the 3 current configuration of the case, subordinate that claim, but we think that the correct answer under the law and 4 5 applying the equities is to keep Aurelius in the case, Your 6 Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Friedman, your reply? 8 9 MR. FRIEDMAN: Let me start, Your Honor, with Rule 10 25, which is fundamentally misinterpreted and misconstrued 11 by Mr. Fisher. Rule 25, as all of the cases and commentaries say, 12 is a rule of procedure. It is utilized by the Federal 13 14 Courts for considerations that are pragmatic and convenient. 15 To begin with, when there is a transfer of an 16 interest during the action Rule 25 permits the action to 17 continue in the names of the original parties. That is a rule of convenience. 18 19 There has never been a case in the Federal Courts, 20 as far as our research reveals, where a defendant seeking to 21 be dismissed on the merits, as we are here, has been held to 22 be required to continue as a defendant because of Rule 25. 23 In this case, and it bears repeating, Aurelius

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has no applicability.

The issue is whether at the time this adversary proceeding began Aurelius Investment was or was not a proper defendant. There's nothing in Rule 25(c) that would countenance the conclusion that the GUC Trust now urges, which is, because Aurelius once held the notes and once filed a proof of claim, it is stuck as a defendant in this adversary proceeding.

Nothing in Rule 25(c) remotely suggests that a defendant seeking dismissal under the circumstances here has the burden of finding a transferee and serving up a new defendant. On the contrary, the practice in the bankruptcy courts, as far as I know, is very clear. I've seen it over and over again in cases. The plaintiff identifies the proper defendants and then sues them.

Here we had the GUC Trust aware about a year before this adversary proceeding started. In fact, Aurelius Investment has provided the information that it has concerning to whom it was sold. It was sold to a broker. The name of the broker was provided. I don't know what the GUC Trust has done. I don't know whether there was a subpoena served on the broker. I don't know whether there are any discovery efforts.

What I hear Mr. Fisher saying now is it would take a year or years to identify the transferees. I don't know.

It is not the responsibility of Aurelius Investment to do more than it has done.

What Mr. Fisher has done, which is part of what plaintiffs do in these situations, is you take steps to provide notice. If in fact Mr. Fisher is correct, and I don't mean to suggest that he is, but if in fact he is correct and he could not through reasonable diligence identify transferees then in those circumstances you do what he is doing. You put people on notice. You put the market on notice. But there's no authority that says one of the things you do is sue the wrong person.

Mr. Fisher began by saying we're suing Aurelius because Aurelius is the record holder, and then he says well I acknowledge that 5.1 and 5.10 are irrelevant for purposes of the issues before the Court.

But the -- the only justification for even claiming, albeit incorrectly, that Aurelius as record holder is a proper defendant is Section 5.1 of the plan, which (a), doesn't apply, is irrelevant as Mr. Fisher acknowledges.

And (b), when you read Section 5.1 of the plan and Section 5.10 of the plan, what follows from the text of those provisions is contrary to what Mr. Fisher is saying.

What follows from the text is you don't have a claim against the party that filed a proof of claim back in 2010. That argument would be potentially available to the

GUC Trust if we were talking about a claim other than a claim based on publicly traded notes. That's what 5.1 says.

5.1 says, if a party asserts a claim in this case, once we get to the distribution record date, if that party is the record holder that's the party with whom the GUC Trust has to deal, but 5.1 says this provision does not apply to claims based on publicly traded securities.

5.10 applies to claims based on publicly traded securities, including explicitly the Nova Scotia note guarantee claims. And what 5.10 makes clear, as you would expect as the law provides in other context, when it comes to publicly traded securities and claims based on them in a bankruptcy case, what matters is not who owned the security when the proof of claim was filed or who owned the security on the distribution record date. What matters is, when the time comes for distribution what do the rules in the securities marketplace tell us about whether the holder as of the record date in the securities marketplace receives the distribution, or whether it was sold with the rights attached?

But the concept that Mr. Fisher is arguing for that you look at when the proof of claim was filed and who filed it and that's the record holder in the bankruptcy case for purposes of subordinating the claim or otherwise dealing with the claim, that has absolutely no support in the law or

in the plan provisions in this case as you would expect.

I -- I also want to mention that Mr. Fisher cites to Your Honor a decision out of the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, which he claims supports his notion that we can treat the claims objection and the adversary proceeding like one proceeding for purposes of Rule 25(c).

I -- I first -- I want to note the case is not cited in their brief. Mr. Fisher said he found it last night. He told me about it this morning. He handed it to me this morning. The case does not support the position of the GUC Trust here.

The case reiterates the basic principle that an adversary proceeding and a claims objection are separate proceedings. They unquestionably are.

This adversary proceeding began on approximately February something of 2012. There was no adversary proceeding before that. Aurelius Investment was not a defendant in any adversary proceeding before that.

What the Texas bankruptcy case says is in a situation where the defendant in the adversary proceeding is also the party who filed the proof of claim that led to the adversary proceeding we are going to hold what that defendant said in his proof of claim as admissible against him as a judicial admission in the adversary proceeding.

But again, the Court makes the point and cites

Seventh Circuit and other authority that adversary proceedings are separate proceedings. Contested matters are separate proceedings.

The notion that that case supports the view that someone who filed a proof of claim at some point in the case and then a response to a claims objection that should be viewed as one proceeding for purposes of Rule 25(c)?

There's absolutely no support for that, and all the commentary about Rule 25(c) makes clears that it is simply being twisted and distorted by the argument suggested by GUC Trust.

All the cases and commentators make the point that Rule 25(c) is procedural. It does not override substance. It does not impose burdens on parties to identify transferees or anything remotely like that.

In fact, when you look at the kinds of cases mentioned by Mr. Fisher involving a corporation and a successor by merger or otherwise, Rule 25(c) cases make the point that if -- if as a matter of substantive law the new corporation is liable, then the procedure is permissible.

Under Rule 25(c) you can either name the new corporation or not.

But Rule 25(c) does not substitute for the substantive law, does not change the substantive law and never, ever provides a basis for asserting a claim as here

Page 85 against the defendant as to which no relief is possible and that's because of the nature of the claims asserted. are claims for subordination or reduction of a claim and Aurelius has no interest in that claim. I think -- I think that's everything I have, Your They've just sued the wrong defendant. We respectfully submit that the motion to dismiss should be granted. Unless, Your Honor, has any questions, I'll sit down. THE COURT: No, I don't. I'll take a recess and then we'll want everybody back here at 12:10. I can't quarantee you that I'll be ready to rule then, but that's when I need you back in the courtroom. We're in recess. MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I'm -- I'm -- may I have a brief opportunity to reply to some of the points that Mr. Friedman made? THE COURT: All right. But limited of course to new stuff he said this second time around. MR. FISHER: Be very brief. With regard to the Basin Resources case out of Texas, Your Honor, the Court there said in general filings on the master docket of a bankruptcy case are not filings in a specific adversary proceeding. But quite on point where you have a proof a claim and then an equitable subordination

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complaint those are a single proceeding. So we think for that reason it's quite on point.

We're not just saying that Aurelius is the right party because they were the holder as of the record date. That's one of many facts. They filed the proof of claim. They continued to hold the proof of claim. They held the proof of claim as of confirmation. They held the proof of claim as of when we filed our objections. They've never taken any step whatsoever to indicate publicly that they're not the holder of the proof of claim until it became an issue in this litigation. The claims register reflects them as the holder of the proof of claim.

One last case I wanted to bring to, Your Honor's attention, which responds directly to a point that -- that Mr. Friedman was making about the lack of authority is Brown v. Meyerburg. It's a Southern District case 314 F. Supp. 939.

In that case it was a case about invalidating a patent, and the case went to judgment, but the patent holder said, I've assigned all my rights in this patent to another party. And the Court said, even so, we -- we have -- because of 25(c), because there hasn't been a motion to substitute that other party, we can get a judgment against the original patent holder and it binds the assignee.

It's very similar to the situation here. Because

it's not just that we're looking to reduce distributions and Aurelius can get off the hook by saying, well, we don't stand to get any distributions anyway, it's that we're looking to equitably subordinate their claim, similar to invalidating a patent.

THE COURT: Well, a patent has in rem

characteristics, if you're talking about the validity of the

patent or its infringement. Wouldn't that again be

something you would simply remind me if the new holder of

the claim surfaces and then says nothing that happened

beforehand affects me?

MR. FISHER: I certainly would remind you of that, Your Honor, but in the Meyerburg case there was a party who was the original holder of the patent that was named as a party, and it's no different from what we've done here, which is name the holder of the proof of claim, or the original holder of the proof of claim as the -- the proper party.

And the last point I wanted to make is simply that there is an aspect in which this case is unique, which is that as, Your Honor, knows there's no indenture trustee. If there were an indentured trustee for these Nova Scotia notes we wouldn't have these issues because there would be a stable defendant who we could sue and get all the relief we needed. We would just sue the indentured trustee.

The problem arises here because these notes can change hands overseas without any readily ascertainable way to find out who the beneficial holder is and there isn't any stable single address to get the relief that we're seeking.

THE COURT: I'm not sure if naming the indentured trustee would skin the cat under circumstances like those that are alleged here.

In -- in my career I'm not sure if I've ever seen an indentured trustee do anything wrong in a bankruptcy case, other than perhaps sleeping through it.

When -- when people who hold bonds misbehave they do it as individuals and the indentured trustee goes to bat for the entirety of the creditor community, which at least in most cases is for the most part wholly innocent and has just been left holding the bag or chose to buy bonds to take the place of people who were holding the bag.

It would seem to me that in a case like this one where you're alleging that -- well -- well, some of your things are applicable to the whole class, but some of them are focused at particular people who did particular things that you think was inequitable.

MR. FISHER: I -- I understand the point, Your

Honor, and so I'd say that, for example, with regards to the re-characterization claim in the complaint that applies to everyone equally.

Pg 89 of 115 Page 89 With regard to equitable subordination, I understand of course that that's particular to a particular claimants hold -- conduct. THE COURT: All right. Anything else? MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, Your Honor, there -- there have been a couple of new things that just came up with Mr. Fisher, including reference to another case that he's just pulled out of his briefcase this morning that was not in papers. THE COURT: You can respond if you want. MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes. Very --THE COURT: I agree with the concept that you don't bring up new cases in surreply. MR. FRIEDMAN: Okay. Well, just very briefly with respect to that case, Your Honor, has absolutely nothing to do with the situation before the Court. That case involved a patent holder who made an assignment of the patent after the litigation was filed. The assignment was made to an assignee who had notice of the pending -- notice of the pending litigation. There was no issue in that case. This was not a case of a motion to dismiss. Court simply said under Rule 25(c) we had a transfer during the pendency of the case. The action continues against the

original party. And to the extent there are issues with

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respect to the assignee, those are issues are dealt with because the assignee took the patent knowing the litigation was pending.

The other point I want to mention is that

Mr. Fisher raises the specter of oh, these notes can trade

and we'll never know who the defendants are. Mr. Fisher's

point about Rule 25 provides him with the very argument that

addresses the worry he's expressed, which is, once the

adversary proceeding is commenced if people are trading,

transferring their interests he then has a basis to argue as

he's arguing here, it was a transfer after the action began

under Rule 25(c) we can continue the case against the

original named defendant.

I'm not -- that's not my issue. My issue is there's nothing in Rule 25(c) that would remotely support suing the wrong defendant and then saying well, there was a transfer before the action -- a year before the action, but he's the one we want to sue.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, now we're going to take a recess and I want you back fives minutes after the original time I told you to be here, at which time I'll also, after I issue my ruling, deal with mediation settlement. That stuff.

We're in recess.

(Recess at 12:24 p.m.)

THE COURT: Have seats please.

Ladies and gentleman, though I can't agree with many of Aurelius' contentions on this motion, especially those in its papers by which it seeks to take positions on behalf of other GM Nova Scotia bond holders and especially seemingly its transferee, I agree that the problem I identify before at the time of Aurelius' 12(b)(6) motion that it was relying on material that could not be considered on a 12(b)(6) motion when Aurelius stated that it had sold its notes and could rely on those facts only on summary judgment has now been addressed.

I'm now allowed to consider material beyond the pleadings, including Aurelius showing as a fact that it sold its notes and it's showing as a mixed question of fact and law that it no longer has a claim in the case.

So I'm dismissing the claims against Aurelius now subject to the GUC Trust right as Aurelius acknowledges. To reinstate its claims, if Aurelius acquires GM Nova Scotia finance notes in the future, or even though Aurelius was silent on this, if in the claims objection proceeding, which is running parallel with this adversary proceeding, Aurelius transferee takes the position that Aurelius' dismissal from this adversary proceeding deprives this Court of the ability to grant full relief.

I'm not persuaded that when it named Aurelius as a defendant here the GUC Trust brought this adversary proceeding against the wrong party. Wholly apart from Aurelius having participated in the conduct, which is alleged to give rise to equitable subordination or disallowance, Aurelius failed for months to disclose basic information relating to the sale of its GM Nova Scotia finance notes and did so only on June 18, the day after I ruled on its 12(b)(6) motion, two months after Aurelius had filed its motion to dismiss, but Aurelius finally has done so.

Assuming, without today deciding, that a claim subject to equitable or subordination -- equitable subordination or disallowance can't be laundered by handing the claim off to someone else it doesn't now appear necessary to have Aurelius in this adversary proceeding to grant appropriate relief with respect to whomever was the recipient of the lateral pass.

That can be addressed in the claims allowance process, which is running in parallel with this adversary proceeding and in which Aurelius is still subject to the jurisdiction of this Court by reason of its filing of its proof of claim on November 30, 2009, which Aurelius hasn't withdrawn and which I may or may not permit Aurelius to withdraw, if and when I'm asked, consistent with Rule 3006,

which among other things allows me to pass on the dismissal of a claim or to attach terms and conditions as the Court deems proper.

At least at this point in time, it is true, as

Aurelius argues, that Aurelius now has no claims to

subordinate, reduce, or disallow, and that's enough to

warrant summary judgment allowing it out of the adversary

proceeding today.

The GUC Trust isn't arguing today that provisions of the plan, Sections 5.1 and 5.10, would be relevant to determining proper parties in this adversary proceeding as compared and contrasted to dealing with the mechanics of distributions on claims. So I don't need to say any more on that issue and I'm not expressing any further views on that today beyond those that I already expressed.

I do have to decide the Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 25 issue. And on this I agree with Aurelius that

Rule 25 doesn't have to be complied with here.

I'm not sure that Civil Rule 25(c) is as limited in its application as Aurelius says it is, but it's undisputed that Aurelius did not make any transfer or assignment of its interests during the pendency of this adversary proceeding. And I agree with Aurelius that Rule 25(c) applies only to transfers that occur after the lawsuit has been commenced.

See Six Morris Federal Practice Section 25.31 [3]

("Rule 25(c) allows substitution only in cases involving transfers of interest occurring during the pendency of litigation and not to those occurring before the litigation begins.")

I recognize and acknowledge the ambiguity during the word litigation -- in the word litigation. As the GUC Trust properly observes, litigation can be made -- understood to mean the adversary proceeding itself, or it can be understood not implausibly to relate to any ongoing litigation between the parties, but at least in a situation where the party sought to be subject to 25(c) compliance doesn't know the assignee, little purpose would be served by imposing 25(c) and subjecting it to accomplishing an impossible task.

Also of course 25(c) can't be read to change substantive rights. So the better way to deal with this situation is to deal in any related litigation with avoiding prejudice to a party like the GUC Trust that has sought and tried its best to go by the rules, and where the impossibilities of compliance with the situation have made it ultimately unsuccessful and required it to deal with alternative means.

There is much is not all in Judge Abramson's analysis in Basin Resources Corporation 182 B.R. 489, with

which I agree, including particular his comments on page

493. In fact, based upon my reading of that opinion so far

I'm not sure if there's anything in that opinion with which

I disagree, at least in terms of Judge Abramson's analysis.

But I see how that might be potentially applicable to

matters down the road, as compared and contrasted to what we have here.

I just can't see it as sufficiently relevant to determining whether compliance should be required under 25(c), which of course is a matter with which Judge Abramson had no occasion to address.

And while I likewise don't agree that the ability to keep a party in a case as a nominal defendant is that big a deal, or that the authority to do so is as limited as Aurelius suggests, I agree that there is no need to keep Aurelius in as a nominal defendant now, even though I manifestly disagree with Aurelius' contention, mentioned twice in its papers at page 10 of its opening brief and page 15 of its reply, that I should be influenced by its contention that it would be burdened by legal fees beyond those it has already incurred.

Aurelius chose to invest in this case to the extent of over \$138 million in bonds, and appears on this date of the record, including matters that were put before me incident to discovery disputes, to have had a very major

role in the transactions that will be subject to judicial scrutiny in the upcoming several weeks.

Aurelius will be a witness no matter what, and it's complaining to me about the cost of being a nominal defendant? I'm choosing not to keep Aurelius in as a nominal defendant because I don't think that it's now necessary, but not because of I -- I have any sympathy for its claim that legal fees incident to its earlier investment decisions and acts should be at all relevant on this motion.

And I'm making my dismissal subject to reinstatement if I see any signs of gamesmanship, such as any assignee claim down the road that Aurelius is a necessary party.

Nor do I need to address Aurelius' contention as appearing repeatedly in its motion papers that claims for equitable subordination or disallowance cannot travel with the claim or be addressed as part of an in rem proceeding.

I'm surprised that Aurelius expects me to endorse such a notion incident to this motion, but for the avoidance of doubt, I'm not endorsing it now, if I ever will.

Nor do I endorse Aurelius' contentions argued at length for three pages in its motion, starting at page 15, as to what's necessary to protect others, including its assignee.

At the risk of stating the obvious, Aurelius lacks

standing to assert the needs and concerns of others, even any entity to whom it might have assigned its claim.

So Aurelius' motion for dismissal on summary judgment at this point is granted.

The ruling is without prejudice to the rights of all parties with respect to entities that now hold GM Nova Scotia notes or who may later have been identified as doing so.

When I say without prejudice to the rights of all parties I mean of course everybody on any side of the issue.

As Aurelius offered, and as in any event I would have required, this dismissal is subject to the GUC Trust right to reinstate its claims if Aurelius acquires GM Nova Scotia finance notes in the future.

Also, I'll go ballistic if in the future of this adversary proceeding, or in the related claims objection proceeding, which is running in parallel with this adversary proceeding, Aurelius' transferee takes the position that Aurelius' dismissal from this adversary proceeding deprives this Court of the ability to grant full relief.

This dismissal is also subject to the Court's rights to reinstate the claims against Aurelius and to hear applications for any further relief if it later turns out that there has any gamesmanship with respect to this dismissal or its consequences.

Aurelius is to work with the GUC Trust to try to consensually agree upon the form of order consistent with this ruling. If after diligent efforts to do so, there is an inability to agree, then either side may settle an order consistent with this ruling no less than two business days' notice by hand, fax, or email. All right. Let's turn now to the matter of mediation. Come on up for anybody who wants to be heard on that. MR. SHER: Your Honor, may I make one comment? THE COURT: Yeah, sure, Mr. Sher. MR. SHER: My apologies. Thank you, Barry Sher. Good afternoon on behalf of Appaloosa. I just want to make a -- a comment in light of the Court's ruling. I took the opportunity to speak with Mr. Fisher on the break. As I had mentioned in one our chamber's conferences, Appaloosa, whom I represent, also sold back in early '11, so similar facts as here. I think in talking to Mr. Fisher, we'll be able to address that issue by way of stipulation or something along those lines. If not in the off chance that we can't I just wanted to put on the record I'm reserving my rights with respect to that issue and that -- and that argument.

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Page 99 1 don't know if Mr. Fisher wants to say --2 THE COURT: Mr. Fisher? 3 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, Mr. Sher and I agreed to talk about the potential implications of Your Honor's ruling 4 5 with regard to Appaloosa and -- and nothing more. 6 can't commit one way or the other as to what will come from 7 those discussions. 8 THE COURT: All right. Well, you got -- you don't 9 normally need reservations of rights from me, Mr. Sher, but 10 like chicken soup I quess they can't hurt. In any event you 11 got them. 12 MR. SHER: That's my view. Thank you, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, we're not staying for 15 the mediation discussion. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. 18 (Pause) THE COURT: Mr. Reisman? 19 20 MR. REISMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Steven 21 Reisman on behalf of the Paulson Noteholders. I neglected 22 to give a card to the court reporter and I don't want to put 23 him out. So if I could approach for one moment. 24 THE COURT: Sure, you bet. 25 MR. REISMAN: Thanks. Thank you, Your Honor.

I -- I rise in regards to Your Honor's request for an update with respect to mediation, which I had suggested at the last hearing before Your Honor in this matter.

I promptly sent out an email to all of the necessary parties -- all of the parties in the matter and inquired of their interest in mediation. Some responded very quickly, others took a little bit of follow up, but I'm happy to report that I've heard back from everybody.

And I can say that with -- well, let me first address Aurelius. Aurelius said no. I think we can dispose of them. They've left and they have no -- no interest in participating in -- in the mediation.

Appaloosa said, okay, but a similar reservation. They're in the same boat as Aurelius.

With respect to the Greenberg Traurig noteholders, with respect to New GM, with respect to Nova Scotia Finance, and with respect to the Brown Rudnick noteholders, everyone said okay, happy to do it. Let's set up a time, neutral third party. Let's get it going.

I heard back yesterday from Mr. Fisher with a response, okay, if the schedule and procedure can be worked out, and he didn't think that it would be capable of being worked out before the trial, and he didn't think that it would be capable of happening during the GAP week, and he didn't think that it would capable of also occurring in the

following week where, Your Honor, has two days, I think, that are available, but there are three days that are not available.

So I read it carefully and -- and he's here and he respond to you, but I read it as, sort of I don't want to tell the Judge no, but there's no good time that's really available to mediate here.

And my view of this matter, and I've read the papers of the -- of the parties is -- and I've heard

Mr. Fisher argue in Court, is the -- the level of preparation that's necessary for mediation is really just handing materials to a neutral third-party mediator.

I think that I could do this and I think clearly the other lawyers that are could this in their -- in their sleep, though they will be conscious during the mediation session.

So I'd like to try and find the time. I'm -- I understand he's going to be on vacation the -- the interim week and people, including myself, have planned a vacation that week, given that Your Honor is going to be out and there are the other pressures of life that -- that go along besides the practice of -- besides the practice of law.

So I'd like to try and find a time that works for everybody, and I'd like to hear from Mr. Fisher as to sort of what he's suggesting, because everyone else -- everyone

else is on board with proceeding with a neutral third-party mediator.

I know we will have an issue. There was a joke that was made to me when I said, they said, well, who do you thinking of for a mediator? And I said, well, I can think of three people off the top of my head. And the response was, tell me your fourth choice. Meaning, I'm going to reject your three first out of hand.

I think there'll be a little bit of, you know, jockeying in that regard, but at the end of the day, I -- I want to pick someone who is honest, fair, but hopefully can bring the sides -- bring the sides together and has no -- we -- we've all agreed not a sitting bankruptcy judge. Someone who is knowledgeable in -- in this particular area.

So with that, if -- if we could hear from Mr. Fisher, and I'm happy to answer any questions, Your Honor, may have.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Fisher?

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I'm not sure how I ended up in this position of being singled out and cornered by Mr. Reisman and portrayed as a hold out.

Mr. Reisman's client has come late to this case.

My understanding is that Paulson has 170 million pound

sterling of notes. That's a lot of notes. Everyone has

responded favorably to Mr. Reisman's suggestion that we try

to settle.

All I said on behalf of the GUC Trust was that we were open to a mediation subject to agreeing on the mediator, the schedule, and the process. I indicated that I was going to be away on vacation during that GAP week. And I said that I was skeptical that during the week when we're also carrying on the trial, on the 21st and the 22nd, that that would be a -- a time when a meaningful mediation could really be accomplished.

I think I ended my email by saying, but I remain open to whatever ideas the group comes up with. It's as simple as that and I resent the effort to characterize my email in any other way.

THE COURT: I -- I didn't regard it as -- as an effort to make you the boogey man, but I -- I did regard it as Mr. Reisman's effort to say that to his astonishment he had found everybody agreeable in principle and that he was then faced with the practical difficulty of turning it into something that might happen.

I didn't regard it as personally as -- as you might have, Mr. Fisher, but of course, I'm not the guy who was on the receiving end of the comment. So -- and I certainly know how I feel every time a higher court says anything about my judicial performance, much less uses the R word.

So let's just figure out a way to solve this Because I think it's fair to say without problem. prejudging anything else that at the end of this trial I'm not going to be ruling off the bench on it, and I also recognize that you guys got a lot of work to do. If I thought that the mediation could enable you guys to settle the matter before the trial is even completed that would be very tempting to me, but I -- I don't know whether that is a realistic expectation, and for sure I -- I don't want to make anybody cancel their vacation, especially if I know I'm going to have to take the matter under submission. So I think what I would like to do is this, because I -- I think that this matter is sufficiently complicated, especially with the presence of the swaps, which are not a immaterial aspect of it. You've got some capable colleagues, Mr. Fisher. -- I think I would like you guys to get the process underway, to pick a mediator, and to get paperwork to the mediator, even if that doesn't include your position statement, which I recognize would be more work and probably more work than Mr. Reisman gave it credit for being.

Any mediator, if he or she is going to do the job right, is going to have to do some reading and head scratching before any meetings. I'd like to get that

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underway.

I don't want any party in this case to be impaired in his or trial prep, and I don't want anybody to lose a vacation, if for no other reason than my belief, having once been a litigator, that in the week before trial you work very hard and you're very tired, and if you're not tired before the trial has even started you're tired after a few days of trial. And you're probably going to want -- everybody is probably going to want that vacation in that middle week, and I'm not going to interfere with that.

But I would like you to see if you can get -- if
there is a time at which you all can set, and if you can't
do it during the GAP week -- and then of course you're going
to be back on trial with me, then you try to do it as soon
thereafter as possible.

I -- I'm telling you now that there isn't going to be a ruling off the bench in this matter. And also, without telling you guys how to practice law, that I assume that if I act -- if I rule adversely to one side or the other there's more than an even likelihood that somebody is going to want to take it up the street, and that's my thinking.

I don't know if I'm on the record now or off, but I have no problems with either way.

MR. REISMAN: Your Honor, if I could just --

THE COURT: Mr. Reisman?

MR. REISMAN: -- just for one moment, Steve 1 2 Reisman. 3 With respect to my comments, I -- I was not trying to antagonize or put Mr. Fisher in a bad spot. Everyone 4 5 else just came back and said yes we'll mediate and there were a bunch of things in -- in his email. 7 I -- I hear him now. When -- when I -- when I -when I make -- when I attack somebody I'm pretty clear in --8 9 in how I -- in how I do it. 10 THE COURT: You're saying you knew attack and this 11 ain't an attack? MR. REISMAN: This is not. This is not -- this is 12 not -- this is not meant in that way in any -- and to that I 13 14 say it on the record, I apologize to Mr. Fisher if in any 15 way I know he perceived it that way and that was not how I 16 intended it and therefore, I apologize, because perception 17 becomes reality. But with respect to -- and I also don't mean to 18 19 belittle the work that there is going to be required in 20 connection with the mediation in preparing the mediation 21 statements, et cetera -- I'm just saying we're all very 22 familiar with the issues and -- and there are briefs that 23 are going on, et cetera. 24 And so what -- what I would propose to do, Your 25 Honor, is I really do think that that following week may be

Page 107 an opportune time to mediate for a day and see where we can 1 2 get in that regard. 3 THE COURT: By following week -- I -- I should of brought my calendar out, I didn't. Which -- which week are 4 5 you talking about? The week in between --6 MR. REISMAN: The 20th. I think it's the week of 7 the -- is that correct? The week of the 20th. 8 THE COURT: Talk about it in qualitative terms, 9 Mr. Reisman. You're talking about the GAP week or the week 10 right after --11 MR. REISMAN: We have trial two days. THE COURT: -- the trial the second week? 12 13 MR. REISMAN: The week right after. So there's 14 the -- there's the trial begins on the 7th, then the 15 following week is off, and then the following week I believe 16 Your Honor is only available two days that week. If I am 17 correct. THE COURT: Well, it may be a little more than 18 19 that if you want just afternoons, but I -- I'm familiar with the week you're talking about now, yes. 20 21 MR. REISMAN: So I was suggesting maybe having it 22 that week. 23 But what I'd like to propose is and I don't want 24 to take up, Your Honor's time, with this, let us caucus, let 25 us see if there is an available date, let us see if

Page 108 1 Mr. Fisher could do this or someone else that -- that's 2 working on -- on it. 3 I know that a number of the people that are trying the case have said that they're not going to be involved in 4 5 the mediation because they're going to be focused on the --6 on the trial, but there are other people in their firms that 7 will be involved. 8 THE COURT: Right. And you don't need me to tell 9 you, Mr. Reisman, nobody in this room needs me to tell you, 10 that not all chess pieces are fungible, and some people can 11 try the case, but are also needed to be there at the mediation and others may not. So you're going to have to 12 13 put the pieces to the puzzle together as best you can. 14 MR. REISMAN: Understood. Yeah, I'm trying to --15 to in fact to do that and to be constructive in that regard 16 and I, you know, I don't if I will be successful, but I 17 think it's clearly worth the effort. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. REISMAN: And we'll coordinate with Mr. Fisher 19 20 and we'll report back to Your Honor subsequently as to the 21 selection of a mediator and getting materials over. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else want to weigh in 23 on that, on any of this? Mr. Steinberg? 24 MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I don't think I have 25 any need to weigh in on the mediation, but I wanted to just

make sure that we weren't leaving, because I did have a question about on the trial week whether we have firmly decided that we are not having anything on August 10th? I just wanted to -- I think it was -- I think Your Honor had -- had indicated an inclination that you probably were not going to give us that day, but I don't think any of the professionals are sure whether that date is -- is on the calendar?

THE COURT: What day of the week is that?

MR. STEINBERG: That's the Friday I think you said you had a personal situation.

THE COURT: Oh, well, I think it's unlikely, but

I've had other things on my plate for the last 48 hours, and

for the next 24 I'll just have to figure out what the facts

are and get back to you soon as I can.

MR. STEINBERG: Sure, I think we're all still up

-- just to be candor with, Your Honor, we have three trial

dates, three days on the week on August 7th, and we have two
half days in the week of August 20th.

And -- and I think Mr. Fisher hasn't committed yet to his schedule of witnesses. He's going first. We're all trying to figure out how to get people available so that it all fits in properly, so we're just trying to figure out what the slotted days might be. But if we can't resolve it today we'll all try to it on our own.

Page 110 I'm telling you we can't resolve it 1 THE COURT: 2 today. 3 All right. Anything else? Mr. Fisher? MR. FISHER: A very small informational question. 4 5 Your Honor's case management order in the joint 6 pretrial order to be submitted asks for contentions of fact 7 on law to be submitted as part of the joint pretrial order, 8 and we've been having some discussion among ourselves as to 9 exactly what Your Honor has in mind with regard to that and 10 what Your Honor would find most helpful. 11 THE COURT: Refresh my recollection on what you quys decided about what kind of briefing there would be and 12 13 when? I'm not sure if you're going to be doing pretrial 14 briefs, whether I need separate contentions in a pretrial 15 order. My standard pretrial order has historically been 16 used, not exclusively of course, but in the matters that are 17 different than this. 18 And so what else have you guys agreed upon in 19 which you're going to be telling me your contentions? 20 MR. FISHER: We -- we've agreed to submit pretrial 21 briefs by this Friday, Your Honor. And so certainly the GUC 22 Trust would be happy to just rely on that in lieu of 23 contentions of fact on law if that's acceptable to the 24 Court. 25 THE COURT: Am I right in assuming that whatever

Page 111 1 contentions anybody has would be stuck in its pretrial 2 brief? 3 MR. O'DONNELL: Your Honor, may I please the Court, Sean O'Donnell with Akin, Gump on behalf of the 4 5 trustee. 6 You -- you are correct in that assumption. And I 7 think I can speak for everyone on the defense side that our 8 preference as well would be to just use the pretrial briefs. THE COURT: Okay. Well, then my -- anybody else 9 10 who wants to weigh in who hasn't? 11 All right. Contentions in the pretrial order are waived. Just tell me whatever you want to tell me your 12 13 pretrial briefs. MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, Arthur Steinberg 14 15 again. 16 I just wanted to make sure. I understand the 17 waiver of the contentions of law, but my understanding was that the pretrial order was still going to have an 18 19 opportunity to set forth the undisputed facts to try to streamline the trial. 20 21 THE COURT: I didn't understand that was what 22 anybody was talking about. 23 MR. STEINBERG: Okay. I just wanted to make sure. That's fine. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

Page 112 Okay. Folks, have a good a day. We're adjourned. (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 12:57 PM) 

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